[This is the full text of the complaint against Dr. Gordon H. Clark in 1944. There could be typographical or transcription errors so please compare the pdf file at: The Complaint. Please let me know of any obvious errors so this transcript can be corrected. Charlie J. Ray. See also: The Answer.]
The Text of a Complaint
Against Actions of the Presbytery of Philadelphia
In the Matter of the Licensure and Ordination of Dr. Gordon H. Clark
The
following is the full text of a complaint signed by a
minority in the Presbytery of Philadelphia of The Orthodox
Presbyterian Church against the action of that presbytery in
the matter of the licensure and ordination of the
Rev. Gordon H. Clark, Ph.D. The complaint was
presented and read on the floor of presbytery at its meeting
on November 20, 1944.
To John P. Galbraith, Stated Clerk of The Presbytery of Philadelphia:
And
now, this sixth day of October, A.D. 1944, come under the
undersigned and complain against the action of the Presbytery
of Philadelphia in holding a “special meeting” of the
Presbytery on July 7, 1944 and against several actions
and decisions taken at that meeting, to wit:
1. The decision to find the call for the meeting in order;
2. The decision to sustain the examination in theology of Dr. Gordon H. Clark;
3. The decision to waive the requirement of two years of study in a theological seminary;
4. The decision to proceed to license Candidate Gordon H. Clark to preach the gospel;
5. The action of licensing Dr. Gordon H. Clark;
6. The decision to deem the examination for licensure sufficient for ordination; and
7. The decision to ordain Dr. Gordon H. Clark at a subsequent meeting of the Presbytery called for that purpose.
In
support of the complaint against the decision to find the call
for the meeting in order the following considerations
are set forth:
The
special meeting of the Presbytery of Philadelphia held at the
Mediator Orthodox Presbyterian Church in Philadelphia on July 7,
1944 was an illegal meeting. In support of this
conclusion the following evidence is cited:
1.
a. The Form of the Government of the Orthodox Presbyterian
Church read, “The presbytery shall meet on its own adjournment;
and when any emergency shall require a meeting sooner than the
time to which it stands adjourned, the moderator, or, in
case of his absence, death, or inability to act, the
stated clerk, shall, with the concurrence or at the
request of two ministers and two elders, the elders being of
different congregations, call a special meeting” (Chapter X,
section 9).
b. The Form of Government of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church
reads, “And in the case of the moderator of the presbytery, he
shall likewise be empowered, on any extraordinary emergency, to
convene the judicatory by a circular letter before the
ordinary time of meeting” (Chapter XIX, section 2).
c. The moderator of the Presbytery of Philadelphia when
requested at the meeting of July 7, 1944 to state the nature of
the emergency which provided the occasion for the special
meeting offered no evidence of the existence of an emergency,
extraordinary or otherwise. Rather, the moderator stated
that the meeting was justified because it suited the
convenience of Dr. Gordon H. Clark and declared that
other special meetings constituted a precedence for this
meeting. Nor has any other evidence of the existence of an
emergency been presented to the presbytery or the complainants.
d. Thus the meeting of the Presbytery of Philadelphia on July
7, 1944 was called, and held, in violation of the Form of
Government of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church.
2.
a. The provision of the Form of Government of the Orthodox
Presbyterian Church quoted above are taken verbatim from the
Form of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., except that in
the second quotation the word “a” is a substitute for the word
“his”. These provisions have stood in the Form of Government
since its adoption by the Synod of New York and Philadelphia in
1788, preparatory to the convening of the first General Assembly
in the following year.
Prior
to 1788, the Synod of New York and Philadelphia, the parent of
the General Assembly, and the highest judicatory then
existing, had been governed by the action in 1729 of the
Synod of Philadelphia in declaring that they judge the
directory for worship, discipline, and government of the
church, commonly annexed to the Westminster Confession, to be
agreeable in substance to the word of God, and founded
thereupon, and therefore do earnestly recommend the same to
all their members, to be by them observed as near as
circumstances will allow, and Christian prudence direct”
(Records of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of
America, Philadelphia, (904, p. 95). Since that
directory made no specific provision concerning special
meetings, the question arose, in the course of time, as
to the calling of special meetings, and a query on the subject
was brought in to the Synod of New York and Philadelphia in
1760, which query read as follows:
“How
many ministers are necessary to request the moderator of the
commission of the Synod, or of any of our Presbyteries, to
oblige the moderator to call any of these judicatures to do
occasional business?” The Synod replied to the query:
“The Synod judge, that meetings of judicatures, pro re nata, can
only be necessary on account of important occurrences unknown
at their last meeting, and which cannot be safely
deferred till their stated meeting, such as scandal raised on a
minister's character, tending to destroy his usefulness, and
bring reproach on religion; or feuds in a congregation
threatening its dissolution; or some dangerous error, or heresy
broached; but not for matters judicially deferred by the
judicature, except some unforeseen circumstance occurs,
which makes it appear that some principal things on
which the judgment depends may then be had, and cannot be
obtained if it is deferred till their stated meeting; nor, for
any matters that ordinarily come in at their stated
meetings” (op. cit., p. 305).
This
action constituted a precedent for the Form of Government when
it was adopted in 1788 and illuminates its meaning.
Furthermore the action was printed in Samuel J. Baird: A
Collection of the Acts, Deliverances, and Testimonies of The
Supreme Judicatory of the Presbyterian Church, from its Origin
in America to the Present Time, the ancestor of the Presbyterian Digest, when it first appeared in 1856. It was reprinted in the second edition. It was carried over into The Presbyterian Digest by William E. Moore and still appears in the latest edition of the Digest, that of 1938. It constitutes an unbroken tradition.
b. The special meeting of the Presbytery of Philadelphia of
July 7, 1944 falls under the direct condemnation of this
precedent, since it did not deal with an occurrence
unknown at the last meeting, nor with a judicial matter,
but did deal with a matter that ordinarily “comes in”
at a stated meeting.
3. a. The term “pro re nata”
was used in connection with special meetings by the
Synod of 1760. It has been an historical usage of the
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. since that time, perhaps
before it, in application to special meetings. J. Aspinwall
Hodge uses it in his What is Presbyterian Courts? (Philadelphia, 1882).
The definition of “pro re nata” in the Oxford English Dictionary
reads, “'for the affair born, i.e. arisen'; for some
contingency arising unexpectedly or without being provided for;
for an occasion as it arises” (vol. VIII, p. 1398). J.
Aspinwall Hodge, in the work just mentioned, says:
“When may 'pro re nata' meetings be called?
“They
may be called 'on account of important occurrences unknown at
their last meeting, and which cannot be safely deferred
till their stated meeting'” (p. 228).
b. The meeting of July 7, 1944 thus violates not only the Form
of Government of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, and the
historical precedence and tradition of the Presbyterian
church but the very definition of a pro re nata meeting.
4.
a. It has been argued that the Presbytery of Philadelphia has
occasionally met in special sessions when no emergency was
present and that precedent was thus established for such
procedure. But that is only to say that Presbytery has
at times erred in this respect. It goes without saying that one
error does not justify another. However, the complainants hold
that there is no evidence that, as a matter of fact, the
Presbytery of Philadelphia has in other instances
transgressed the provisions of the constitution concerned. The
minutes of the Presbytery of Philadelphia contained in the
record books of the Presbytery in August, 1944 record twenty-one
special meetings, as distinct from regular or adjourned
meetings, whose minutes have been approved to date.
Of
that number, nineteen were concerned entirely with the approval
of the sending of calls, the reception of churches, the
installation of pastors, the dismissal of members, the
erasure of the names of members, the dissolution of pastoral
relationships, the notifying sessions of dissolutions,
the declaring of pulpits vacant, the acceptance of resignations
from offices in this connection, the granting of permission to
reside without the bounds of presbytery and the
ordination of candidates without further examination. In short,
they dealt either with changes of pastoral or ecclesiastical
status which had arisen in the interval between stated
meetings or were for the purpose of ordaining candidates
without further examination.
Of
the two remaining meetings, one was called in answer to a
special request from the Redeemer Church and appointed a
committee to confer with the congregation of that
church; and the other was called to deal with the report
of a committee to prepare an answer to the request of the
Presbytery of Ohio and was called in accordance with the
direction of the previous regular meeting ordering the
committee to present its recommendations at the “earliest
possible moment”.
b. The minutes of the Presbytery therefore indicate that in the
past the Presbytery has held special meetings only when matters
concerning pastoral relationships or the ordination of
men already examined were concerned, where a new matter
had suddenly arisen, or where the presbytery itself had directed
action at the “earliest possible moment”. No special meeting
comparable to the meeting of July 7, 1944 has ever been held by
the Presbytery of Philadelphia.
We conclude therefore that the meeting of July 7th
was unconstitutional. It was clearly illegal in the light of
the specific requirements of the Form of Government that the
calling of special meetings is justified only when an
emergency exists. It also stands condemned in the light
of historic precedent.
In
the light of the foregoing considerations the complainants
request that the meeting of the Presbytery of Philadelphia
held on July 7, 1944 be found to have been illegally
convened and that its acts and decisions and the acts
and decisions issuing therefrom be declared null and
void.
In
support of the complaint against the actions and decisions
numbered 2 to 7 the following considerations are set forth:
I.
The Christian doctrine of the knowledge of God is distinguished
as well by its affirmation of the incomprehensibility of God as
by its assertion of his knowability. The point does not
need to be labored that the knowability of God lies at
the very foundation of Christianity. That God can be known, and
that he has given a knowledge of himself through his works and
words, is pervasively taught in the Scriptures. The possibility
and actuality of true religion depend upon the light and truth
which God communicates to men. Skepticism and
agnosticism are thoroughly anti-Christian.
In
avoiding skepticism and agnosticism, however, Christianity has
been insistent that the knowledge of God which is possible for men, possible because of the fact of divine
revelation, is not and can never become comprehension
of God. The doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God is as
ultimate and foundational as the doctrine of his
knowability. The doctrine of the incomprehensibility of
God is not a mere qualification of his knowability; it is not
the doctrine that God can be known only if he makes himself
known and in so far as he makes himself known. It is
rather the doctrine that God because of his very nature
must remain incomprehensible to man. The question of
the power of God to reveal himself to man does not enter
into the elements of this doctrine. Because of his very nature as infinite and absolute
the knowledge which God possesses of himself and of all
things must remain a mystery which the infinite mind of
man cannot penetrate. The divine knowledge as divine, transcends human knowledge as human,
even when that human knowledge is a knowledge communicated by God. Man may possess true knowledge as he thinks God's thoughts
after him. But because God is God, the creator,, and man is man,
the creature, the difference between the divine knowledge and
the knowledge possible to man may never be conceived of merely
in quantitative terms, as a difference in degree rather than a
difference in kind. Otherwise the Creator-creature relationship
is broken down at a most crucial point, and there is an
assault upon the majesty of God.
The
doctrine of the divine incomprehensibility is not a
specifically Reformed doctrine. In view, however, of the
peculiar emphasis of the Reformed theology upon the
divine sovereignty and transcendence, it is not
surprising that it has been most careful to state and expound
it. As indicative of the place occupied by this doctrine in
Reformed thought mention may be made of the fact that in the
monumental work of Bavinck, the first subject treated
under the doctrine of God is his incomprehensibility,
and that, only after devoting 28 pages to this subject,
does he proceed to deal with the knowability of God.
A
few quotations from Reformed writers will serve to set forth
more adequately the classic doctrine of
incomprehensibility. Calvin's teaching, because of the unique
place which his thought occupies in the history of
Reformed thought, is of special interest. Calvin says
that the divine essence is incomprehensible, that his majesty is
not to be perceived by the human senses, that what God is in
himself we cannot know, that from the nature of the case
we may learn from his divine activities only what he is
to us, that it would be presumptuous curiosity to attempt to
examine into his essence, that rather we must be content
to adore, to fear and to reverence him (Institutes, v. 1, 9; ii. 2; x. 2; cf. Warfield, Calvin and Calvinism, pp. 150ff.).
Charnock
sets forth the incomprehensibility of God both in his discourse
entitled, “On God's Being a Spirit” and in that entitled, “On
God's Knowledge”:
“God
is therefore a Spirit incapable of being seen, and infinitely
incapable of being understood. . . . There is such a
disproportion between an infinite object and a finite sense and
understanding, that it is utterly impossible either to behold or
comprehend him.” (Discourses on the Existence and Attributes of God, New York, 1886, pp. 184f.).
“We
cannot have an adequate or suitable conception of God:
He dwells in inaccessible light; inaccessible to the acuteness
of our fancy, as well as the weakness of our sense. If we could
have thoughts of him as high and excellent as his nature,
our conceptions must be as infinite as his nature. All
our imaginations of him cannot represent him, because every
created species is finite; it cannot therefore represent
to us a full and substantial notion of an infinite
Being. . . . Yet God in his word is pleased to below his
own excellency, and point us to those excellencies in his works,
whereby we may ascend to the knowledge of those excellencies
which are in his nature. But the creatures, whence we draw our
lessons, being finite, it is utterly impossible to have a
notion of God commensurate to the immensitiy and spirituality
of his being” (idem, p. 196. See also pp. 183, 451, 358).
J. H. Thornwell in his lecture on “The Nature and Limits of our Knowledge of God” (Collected Writings,
Vol. I, Richmond, 1871) also clearly draws a qualitative
distinction between the divine knowledge and the
knowledge that is possible to man. While the whole
discussion on pp. 104-142 is pertinent a few quotations must
suffice here:
“His
infinite perfections are veiled under finite symbols. It is
only the shadow of them that falls upon the human understanding”
(p. 118).
“Again
the difference betwixt Divine and human knowledge is not only
simply of degree. It is a difference in kind. God's knowledge is
not like ours, and therefore we are utterly unable to
think it as it is in Him. We can only think it under the
analogy of ours in the sense of a similarity of relations” (pp.
121f.).
“This
protest is only a series of negations—it affirms simply what
God is not, but by no means enables us to conceive what He
really and positively is. It is the infinite and
absolute applied to the attributes which we are striving to
represent. Still these negative notions are of immense
importance. They are clear and pregnant confessions that there
is a transcendent reality beyond all that we are able to
conceive or think in comparison with which our feeble thoughts
are but darkening counsel by words without knowledge”
(p. 122).
“Most
heresies have risen from believing the serpent's lie,
that our faculties were a competent measure of universal truth.
We reason about God as if we possessed an absolute knowledge.
The consequence is, we are lost in confusion and error. . . . It
is so easy to slide into the habit of regarding the
infinite and the finite as only different degrees of the
same thing, and to reason from one to the other with
the same confidence with which, in other cases, we
reason from the less to the greater, that the caution cannot be
too much insisted upon that God's thoughts are not our thoughts,
nor God's ways our ways” (pp. 140f.).
“Our
ignorance of the Infinite is the true solution of the
most perplexing problems which encounter us at every step in the
study of Divine truth. We have gained a great point when we
have found that they are truly insoluble—that they contain one
element which we cannot understand, and without which the
whole must remain an inexplicable mystery. The
doctrines of the Trinity, of the Incarnation, of the Prescience
of God and the Liberty of Man, the Permission of the
Fall, the Propagation of Original Sin, the Workings of
Efficacious Grace, all these are facts which are clearly taught;
as facts they can be readily accepted, but they defy all
efforts to reduce them to science. . . . Our wisdom is
to believe and adore” (pp. 141f.).
Although
Charles Hodge's particular treatment of the doctrine of
incomprehensibility is brief, it is to the point, and likewise
bases the doctrine upon the distinction in nature between the
Almighty and the creature:
"When
it is said that God can be known, it is not meant that
He can be comprehended. To comprehend is to have a complete and
exhaustive knowledge of an object. It is to understand its
nature and its relations. . . . God is past finding out. We
cannot understand the Almighty to perfection. . . . Such
knowledge is clearly impossible in a creature, either of itself or of anything outside of itself” (Systematic Theology, I, p. 337).
“It
is included in what has been said, that our knowledge of God is
partial and inadequate. There is infinitely more in God
than we can have any idea of; and what we do know, we know
imperfectly” (ibid.).
Shedd is also worth hearing. He says:
“Man
knows the nature of finite spirit through his own
self-consciousness, but he knows that of the Infinite spirit
only analogically. Hence some of the characteristics of the
Divine nature cannot be known by a finite intelligence.
For example, how God can be independent of the
limitations of time and have an eternal mode of
consciousness that is without succession, including all events
simultaneously in one omniscient intuition, is inscrutable to
man, because he himself has no such consciousness” (Dogmatic Theology, I, p. 152).
“Although God is an inscrutable mystery, he is yet an object of thought” (idem, p. 156).
Finally, a few sentences from Bavinck.
“This
doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God and of the
unknowability of his essence becomes also the point of departure
and the founational thought of Christian theology. God is
not exhausted in his revelation, whether in creation or
re-creation. He cannot fully communicate himself to his
creatures because they would then themselves have to be God.
There is therefore no adequate knowledge of God” (Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, II, p. 10).
“There is no knowledge of God as he is in himself. We are men and he is
the Lord our God. . . . He is infinitely far exalted
above our conception, our thought, our language. He is
not to be compared with any creature. . . . He can be
apprehended, not comprehended. --Thus speaks the whole of
Scripture and the whole of Christian theology. And when a
superficial nationalism has thought an adequate knowledge of
God possible, Christian theology has always fought it
most strenuously” (p. 23).
“The
knowledge that we possess of God is altogether distinctive. It
can be called a positive knowledge in so far as through it we
recognize a being who is infinitely different from all
finite creatures. It is, on the other hand, negative because we
cannot ascribe a single predicate to God as we conceive of such a
predicate in his creatures. And it is therefore analogical
because it is the knowledge of a being who in himself is
unknowable but nevertheless can make something of himself known
to his creatures” (p. 24).
“Christian
theology beholds here an adorable mystery. It is completely
incomprehensible for us that and how God can reveal
himself and to an extent make himself known in the creature, the
eternal in time, the immeasurable in space, the infinite in the
finite, the unchangeable in change, being in becoming, that
which is already as if it existed in that which does not exist.
This mystery is not to be comprehended, it can alone be
gratefully acknowledged” (pp. 24f.)
“Mystery is the element in which theology lives” (p. 1).
That
this doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God as expounded by
Reformed theology is the doctrine of the Confession of Faith,
II, 1, and of the Larger Catechism, 7, cannot be doubted.
In the nature of the case the doctrinal standards do
not expound the meaning of the word “incomprehensible”
where it is employed. Nevertheless, its meaning does not remain
uncertain because of its uniform significance in the
history of Christian thought which constitutes the background
of the formulation of these standards. The context provided by
the standards themselves, moreover, serves to confirm this
conclusion. In describing God as “infinite in being and
perfection” and as “most absolute” (II, 1) and as having “all
life, glory, goodness, blessedness, in and of himself” and as
being “alone in and unto himself all-sufficient” (II, 2) the
Confession clearly conceives of the nature and attributes of God
as beingg infinitely exalted above the nature and
qualities of the creature whether in this life or in the
life to come. More specifically, when it speaks of the
knowledge of God as infinite (II, 2) that knowledge of God is
evidently thought of as differing from the knowledge possible to
the creature in a qualitative sense, and not merely in
degree. And nothing is more obvious than that in characterizing
God as “incomprehensible”, the Confession does not mean merely
that God is unknown unless he reveals himself. God does not become less incomprehensible through the historical process of revelation.
Rather his incomprehensibility is viewed as an attribute of God
as he is in himself, without which he would not be God,
as absolute and unalterable as his immutability, his
omnipotence and the other attributes referred to in the same
sentence (II, 1). Now since God is incomprehensible, his
revelation of himself cannot have the purpose of providing an
adequate or exhaustive knowledge of himself; the
revelation is directed to the needs of men (Confession I, 1).
Nor does the doctrine of the plainness of Scripture (I, 7) mean
that the revelation which God has been pleased to give of
himself is meant to be exhaustively understood. It is
indeed inherently perspicuous, and it is plain to man in
the sense that man “may attain unto a sufficient understanding”
of “those things which are necessry to be known, believed, and
observed, for salvation”, but this is far from implying
that there are not mysteries set forth in the divine
revelation that are quite beyond the powers of the finite mind
to comprehend.
That
this doctrine of the divine incomprehensibility is the teaching
of the Scriptures does not require any elaborate proof.
The doctrine is taught in many passages and is implicit
in the doctrine of the divine transcendence which is
everywhere taught or presupposed in Scripture. A few of the most
explicit passages may be passed in review. The
proof-text supplied with the reference in the Confession is Psalm 145:3. “His greatness is unsearchable.” Isaiah 40:28 also states that “there is no searching of his understanding” while Job 11:7 f.
asks, “Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find
out the Almighty to perfection? It is high as heaven: what
canst thou do? Deeper than Sheol; what canst thou know?” In
these passages far more is taught than that man is dependent
upon the divine revelation for knowledge of God; there is a
reverent acknowledging of the exceeding greatness of God and of
his knowledge which man as a creature cannot know in any
adequate way. Even more clearly perhaps, the gulf which
separates the divine knowledge from human knowledge is
set forth in Isaiah 55:8, 9.
“For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways
my ways, saith Jehovah. For as the heavens are higher than the
earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my
thoughts than your thoughts.” In I Timothy 6:16
the Lord of Lords is described as “dwelling in light
unapproachable, whom no man hath seen or can see”, thus
indicating not merely that God is invisible because of his
spirituality but also that the light in which God dwells
is so glorious that man the creature may never trespass or even
draw near to contemplate God as he is in himself. Only
the divine Son has that adequate knowledge of God which
makes a revelation of God possible (John 1:18; 6:46).
Only the Son has a knowledge of the Father that is on a
level with the Father's knowledge of the Son; only the
Son's knowledge of the Father is exhaustive knowledge;
the knowledge which men may come to possess of the
Father and of the Son is knowledge on a lower level,
apprehension but not comprehension, for otherwise mere men would
have to be accorded a place alongside of Christ who alone
“knows the Father” (Mt. 11:27; Luke 10:22. Cf. Also Romans 11:33; Deuteronomy 29:29).
Now
the judgment to which with deep sorrow we have been
compelled to come is that the doctrine of the knowledge
of God which was set forth before the Presbytery of
Philadelphia by Dr. Clark is very far from being in
agreement with the high view of Scripture and of the Confession
and Catchisms as that has been expounded above. It is true
indeed that Dr. Clark accepts the term
“incomprehensible” as a quality of God. But the issue of course
is not settled by the bare acceptance of the language of
the standards. The modernists in our day have freqently
indicated a readiness to accept the language of the historic
creeds, but have reinterpreted that language to mean something
sharply at variance with their historic meaning. It is our
contention that Dr. Clark's view of the incomprehensibility of
God is definitely at variance with the meaning that this
doctrine has had in Christian theology.
In
expounding Dr. Clark's views we appeal to the stenographic
record of his examination before the presbytery. The record
is far from accurate in detail but the expressions on this
doctrine are so comprehensive and repeated that no doubt remains
as to its essential elements. The references are to
page and line in the record.
Dr.
Clark's definition of the incomprehensibility of God
serves as an appropriate starting point. By this
doctrine he means “that God knows every proposition and that
those propositions are infinite in number and that we
shall not exhaust them when he reveals them to us one at a
time” (27:19ff. Cf.
37:19ff.). The Scriptural statement that the ways of God are
past finding out Dr. Clark would explain by saying “that no
endeavor on our part can discover certain truths
about God but those truths can be obtained only by
revelations and we cannot solve them on our own
initiative . . .” (20:9ff.).
When
this definition is analyzed with the help of the rest of his
testimony, it will appear that Dr. Clark denies that there is
any qualitative distinction between the contents of
the knowledge of God and the contents of the
knowledge possible to man, but rather in so far as
there is any distinction between these two the distinction is
merely quantitative. The demonstration of this conclusion may
most conveniently proceed by taking note of three
stages in Dr. Clark's development of his views.
1.
The fundamental assumption made by Dr. Clark is that truth,
whether in the divine mind or in the human mind, is always
propositional. Truth, it is said, cannot be conceived of
except in terms of propositions (Cf.
2:9ff.; 11:2, 14f.; and especially 22:19ff.). It will be
observed that Dr. Clark does not claim to derive this
judgment from Scripture; it is rather regarded as an
axiom of reason (Cf. 36:13-17; 19:19ff.).
It
is not necessary or appropriate to consider here all of the
implications of this fundamental assumption. A few
observations are, however, of immediate importance. This view
of truth, it will be noted, conceives of truth as
fundamentally quantitative, as consisting of a series of
distinct items. Now even if it could be assumed that
human knowledge has this propositional character, it
would still involve a tremendous assumption to conclude that
the divine knowledge must possess the same character. Since
our thinking is pervasively conditioned by our
creaturehood, we may not safely infer the character
of our knowledge what must be true of the knowledge of the
Creator. Even if we could be sure that human knowledge might
be resolved into distinct propositions, it would not
necessarily follow that the knowledge of God, who penetrates
into the depths of his own mind and of all things at a glance,
would be subject to the same qualification. And it may not be
overlooked in this connection that Dr. Clark does
not claim Scriptural proof for his fundamental
assumption as to the character of knowledge.
2.
The far-reaching significance of Dr. Clark's starting point,
as observed under 1. above, is evident when we note that Dr.
Clark holds that man's knowledge of any proposition,
if it is really knowledge, is identical with God's
knowledge of the same proposition. If knowledge is a matter of
propositions divorced from the knowing subject,
that is, of self-contained, independent statements, a
proposition would have to have the same meaning for man as for
God. And since Dr. Clark holds that no limitation may be
placed upon God's power to reveal propositions one at a time
to men, there is no single item of knowledge in
God's mind which may not be shared by the human
mind.
That
the above statement is a fair representation of Dr. Clark's
reasoning is abundantly borne out by the record. See
2:22ff.; 18:23f.; 20:22ff.; 28:14-17ff.; 32:25-33:4; 50:11-21;
51:3-7. These include the following statements:
“God can reveal any particular proposition to man, and if God
can make sons of Abraham out of stones on the
roadway, he can make even a stupid person understand a
proposition” (2:22ff.). “. . . if we don't know the object
that God knows, then we are in absolute ignorance” (28:16f.).
In answer to the question, “You would say then, that
all that is revealed in the Scripture is capable of
being comprehended by the mind of man?”, Dr. Clark
answered, “Oh yes, that is what it is given to us for,
to understand it” (20:22ff.).
It
would seem here that Dr. Clark is seeking to work out a
theory of knowledge which, over against agnosticism
and skepticism, will assure man of actual and
certain knowledge. By appealing to the power of God
reveal knowledge, and by resolving knowledge into detached
items, he argues that man may be assured of true knowledge
since his knowledge corresponds wholly with the divine
knowledge of the same propositions.
While
we appreciate the effort to arrive at certainty with
reference to man's knowledge of God, in our judgment
this is done at too great a cost. It is done at the
sacrifice of the transcendence of God's knowledge.
His thoughts are not our thoughts. His ways are past
finding out. The secret things belong unto the Lord our God.
If we are not to bring the divine knowledge of his thoughts
and ways down to human knowledge, or our human
knowledge up to his divine knowledge, we dare not maintain
that his knowledge and our knowledge coincide at any single point.
Our knowledge of any proposition must always remain the
knowledge of the creature. As true knowledge, that knowledge
must be analogical to the knowledge which God
possesses, but it can never be identified with the
knowledge which the infinite and absolute Creator possesses
of the same proposition.
3.
Finally, however, Dr. Clark seems to reckon with the infinity
of God and thus also to hold to a certain conception of
incomprehensibility. The divine knowledge consists of an infinite number of propositions, and since man is
a temporal creature, it will not be possible even in eternity
to reveal this infinite series of propositions to
man (Cf. 34:5;
52:15ff.). It is illuminating that Dr. Clark does not base his
doctrine of incomprehensibility upon the distinction between
God as infinite and man as finite (Cf.
45:24f.), nor on the consideration that, if God were fully to
reveal himself to his creatures, the creatures
would themselves have to be God (Cf.
46:16ff.). It is based solely upon the judgment that man as a
temporal being cannot be conceived of as receiving
an infinite number of revelations. It is clear again that the
approach of Dr. Clark is quantitative through and
through. It is the number of the propositions, rather than
their content as such, not to speak of the
inscrutable mystery of the mind of God which is viewed as
excluding an exhaustive revelation of the divine mind.
Dr.
Clark here, in a very restricted way, takes cognizance of
infinity in connection with the divine knowledge but he
seems to interpret infinity in terms of mathematical
definition rather than as a theological distinction. He
constantly appeals to the arithmetical series to
illustrate the infinite (11:24ff.; 15:20ff.; 21:12ff.) and
even at one point denies that one may properly speak of “all”
of the propositions in God's knowledge, since then they
would not be “infinite”, appealing (in a remark
unfortunately not included in the record) to the
help which mathematics affords in this connection
(38:19ff.).
Now
this view of infinity is altogether inadequate as applied to
the knowledge of God. It is at best a quantitative
category. And if one may not speak of “all” of the
propositions constituting the divine knowledge, it would
suggest that infinity means that which is
unfinishable. If so, the self-sufficiency, the perfection of
God, is not maintained. (At other points, indeed, Dr. Clark
seems to be employing a different conception of
infinity, as when he states that the attributes are
infinite as being “limited by nothing outside of
himself” (11:6).
It
may be objected to the exposition of Dr. Clark's views
presented above that it leaves out of account the
important consideration that Dr. Clark allows that
beyond the knowledge of a proposition there is the
knowledge of the implications of a proposition, and that the
knowledge which man may enjoy of a proposition does not
necessarily carry with it a knowledge of its implications.
This qualification, however, does not affect Dr.
Clark's basic position in any substantial way. The
implications of propositions are after all, on his
view, also propositions. Consequently, the inclusion of such
propositions among the number of propositions that are thought
of as constituting the divine knowledge does not
require any modification of the judgment that the
distinction between the divine knowledge and the
knowledge possible to man is merely quantitative.
Another
possible objection to the foregoing might take the form that
he does not draw a qualitative distinction between
the knowledge of God and the knowledge possible for
men since he freely recognizes a fundamental difference
between the mode
of God's knowledge and that of man's knowledge. God's
knowledge is intuitive while man's is discursive (Cf.
18:5f., 18ff.). Man is dependent upon God for his knowledge.
We gladly concede this point, and have reckoned with
it in what has been said above. However, this
admission does not affect the whole point at issue
here since the doctrine of the mode of the divine knowledge
is not a part of the doctrine of the imcomprehensibility of
his knowledge. The latter is concerned only with the
contents of the divine knowledge. Dr. Clark
distinguishes between the knowledge of God and of
man so far as mode of knowledge is concerned, but it is a
tragic fact that his dialectic has led him to obliterate the
qualitative distinction between the contents of the divine
mind and the knowledge which is possible to the creature,
and thus to impinge in a most serious fashion upon
the transcendence of the divine knowledge which is expressed
by the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God.
We
may also point that, even to the extent that Dr. Clark
affirms the incomprehensibility of God, he does not
do so in a manner that provides solid assurance that it is a
stable element in his thought about God. At the
March, 1944, meeting of presbytery, Dr. Clark was
not even ready to say categorically that the number of
propositions in the divine knowledge was infinite. And in the
July examination, he seems at times to have been far
from sure of his position. He says, for example,
that “it seems to me entirely likely,
though the exegesis is a littlee weak; but it seems to me
entirely likely that there will always be certain
particular truths that we do not know” (2:10ff.).
Finally, if “in all probability there will be no
end” to the increase of our knowledge of God in heaven
(2:4ff.), and if it is only the infinite number
of propositions in the divine knowledge which distinguishes
it from the knowledge which man may receive, this
distinction approaches a vanishing point.
We
judge then that Dr. Clark's view of the incomprehensibility
of God, as presented to the Presbytery of
Philadelphia, is not a proper one. And that he is in error
seems to be due to the fact that he does not
approach the doctrine by way of an exegesis of Scripture. His
approach, in the contrary, while admittedly taking into
account certain teachings of Scripture, is to a large extent
rationalistic. His argument is built up from certain
principles derived from reason. One cannot expect a sound
theology to proceed from a faulty method. In short, therefore,
we hold that both the formulation of this doctrine and the
method by which it is it is reached are out of
harmony with orthodox Presbyterianism.
II.
If the first error concerns Dr. Clark's view of the
relation of man's knowledge to God's knowledge, there is a
second error closely related to this one: namely, his
view of the relation of the faculty, to other faculties of the
soul. Again here, Dr. Clark's statements are a highly
unsatisfactory representation of the teaching of Scripture
and of our subordinate standards, as well as of the great
writings of Reformed theology.
It
may be objected immediately that this is not a problem
in theology as such, but as a secondary problem of human
psychology, of which the Bible and our standards have
but little to say, and which cannot be considered essential to
orthodoxy or a Reformed position. At least, however, the
problem is one of applied psychology, and particularly
one of psychology as applied to man's religious activity. Of
that subject, the Bible has a great deal to say, and the whole
locus of Soteriology is deeply concerned with man's
religious activity. Of that subject, the Bible has a
great deal to say, and the whole locus of Soteriology is
deeply concerned with man's reaction to God's saving work. As
can be seen in detail from the following discussion, the
supposed psychological problem touches most pointedly on any
number of highly essential theological questions.
Any
statement of the relation between the intellectual and the
other spiritual faculties must needs be concerned with God as
well as with man. Although comparatively little was said
in the course of Dr. Clark's examination to outline his
position. Dr. Clark should certainly not be accused of dividing
the nature of God, or even of man into discrete parts
which might be labeled “intellect”, “emotion”, and “volition”,
or by other terms. However, since he is willing, at least for
words as indicating different faculties there is
certainly meaning in what has been said on the subject.
First
of all, Dr. Clark specifically states (p. 16) that the
statement of the Westminster Confession that “God is
without . . . passions” means that God is lacking in
feeling and emotion. Although he objects to a definition
of feeling or emotion which would make those words mean
anything different from “passions”, he does not make provision
for any other faculty in God's nature which would be
non-intellectual and non-volitional.
Secondly,
to round out the picture, Dr. Clark apparently does
assume that God has both intellectual and volitional
faculties, for he talks about the decretive and
preceptive will of God, as well as about God's knowledge.
As
for Dr. Clark's views on human psychology and religious
activity, the evidence is much more complete. Again, Dr. Clark
must not be accused of splitting up man's soul into
sections, with one of which he thinks, with another of which he
wills, and so on. It would even appear that Dr. Clark is
reluctant to speak of distinct faculties (pp. 39-40),
but he is willing to do so at least for the sake of argument.
Presumably his reluctance is in
the interests of protecting the unity and integrity of the
human soul, which is indeed a commendable motive.
However, quite a bit is said about the relation
between the various faculties or activities of the
undivided human soul, which merits close study.
While
Dr. Clark is “willing to admit [that] the intellect and
volition and emotion are equally essential to a human
being”, he maintains that “they have different
functions” and “that the intellect is a supreme
function” (p. 13).. The intellectual apprehension of God
is man's “method of enjoying God forever and . . . the
greatest religious activity” (p. 13), and he equates the
contemplation of God with glorifying and enjoying
God (p. 14). Volitional activity on man's part is
considered a means to the end of intellectual contemplation
(29:3-6; 39:15-24; 40:19-41:1; 42:6-10). Of all the
activities that are colloquially called “emotions”, love was
the only one prominently mentioned in the examination; Dr.
Clark considers love, in the theological sense, as volitional
(29:11-12). By exclusion, however, Dr. Clark denies any
important place in man's religious activity to anything
which is colloquially referred to as an “emotion”;
at best, that would also be a means to the end of
contemplating God.
This
statement of the “primacy” of the intellect carries with it
certain ideas about volition as such. The activity of the will
which Dr. Clark subordinates to intellection seems
to be little more than “a voluntary act of paying
attention”, which results in an intellectual apprehension
(29:3-4). If it may be assumed that outward acts are also the
results of volitional activity, then the volitions
that give rise to our obeying God's commands also seem to
be of a low level, for glorification of God is said to include
“the ordinary act[s] of obedience on a purely common
plane such as “Thou shalt not steal” (32:1-4; italics added).
In any case, such volitions are held to be on a
much lower level than intellectual contemplation of
God.
Above
all, however, Dr. Clark's statements about the primacy of the
intellect in man's religious activity must be connected with
what he says about “knowing” in other connections.
To sum up in the clearest available quotation what has been
clearly stated already, Dr. Clark says, “The only
kind of knowledge [with] which I am familiar is the knowledge
of the proposition; knowledge is the possession of truth, and
the only truth I know anything about is a
proposition” (22:18-21). The clear meaning of Dr. Clark is,
then, that man's highest religious activity is to have an
intellectual apprehension of propositions contained in
God's knowledge, such as “two plus two equals four”,
or “God is love”. Dr. Clark frankly says that he does not
know what is meant by knowing the love of God
(22:10-21); man's religious activity must be confined to
knowing such things as the fact that God is love. This
knowledge, to be sure, is supposed to include volition and
perhaps even emotion, but aside from merely paying
attention in order to learn, nothing is said about
any but the purely intellectual activity of apprehending
propositions. In fact, it is perfectly clear, from the
statements that man's highest religious activity is
intellectual and that intellection means knowing propositions,
that Dr. Clark conceives of man's religion as
nothing greater than knowing propositions as such. This
knowing of propositions cannot, in the nature of the case,
reflect or inspire any recognition by man of his relation to
God, for the simple reason that the propositions have
the same content, mean the same, to God and man. It
would seem clear without going any farther that Dr.
Clark has done one of two things: either he has
emasculated the words “emotion” and “volition” so that they
imply almost none of the ideas that are customarily assigned
to them in colloquial usage, or he has ruled them out of the
intellect in spite of his statements to the
contrary. Dr. Clark deserves the highest
commendation for his faithful opposition to any form of
humanistic emotionalism in theology. However, when his
position is compared with the teachings of the Bible, the
Westminster Standards, and also with the writings of
Reformed theologians, it unfortunately begins to
appear that he is in grave danger of falling into the
equally serious error of humanistic intellectualism. No
Calvinist would for a moment deny the tremendous importance of
knowledge and of the intellect; a Calvinist might
even say that knowledge is the first requirement of
such a religious activity as faith. However, neither
the Bible nor the standards nor the theologians of the
Reformed tradition support such a view of the primacy of the
intellect as that outlined above.
What,
in the first place, is the Reformed teaching about the
aspects of God's nature, or, if you will, the
faculties which reside in God? That God has knowledge and will
is agreed by all. The questions that must concern
us are two: Does God have what may properly be called
“emotions”? and, what is the relation between God's faculties?
If we assign to the word “emotion” an a priori
definition which in the nature of the case identifies emotion
with “passions”, it would obviously be denying our
standards to say that God has emotions (Westminster Confession, II, 1).
God does not change; there is no shadow of turning in him; he
is not a man that he should repent; he is immutable.
Certainly, also, God does not share certain of the qualities
which we call “emotions”, such as fear, longing, and surprise.
If we are to speak of feelings or emotions in God at all,
we must confine ourselves to his attributes which are
sometimes summed up under the word “benevolence”: love,
goodness, mercy, and grace. Even here, we must be careful to
defend the immutable self-determination of God. But
the question still remains, can these be identified
with, or associated with, the idea of “emotion” or
“feeling”? Obviously, we define those words in their narrow
but perfectly good colloquial sense as something which arouses
the will and thus determines action. In fine, is
there any quality or faculty in God which is neither
intellectual nor volitional, and which underlies or
accompanies volitional activity? That question, in
similar words, Dr. Clark studiously avoided answering (p. 16).
On precisely the same subject, Charles Hodge makes a very clear statement (Systematic theology, vol. I, pp. 428-9):
“Love
of necessity involves feeling, and if there be no feeling in
God, there can be no love. That he produces
happiness is no proof of love. The earth does that
unconsciously and without design. Men often render
others happy from vanity, from fear, or from caprice. Unless
the production of happiness can be referred, not only to a
conscious intention, but too a purpose dictated by kind
feeling, it is no proof of benevolence. And unless the
children of God are the objects of his complacency
and delight, they are not the objects of his love.”
Although
love may, perhaps, be volitional, it must involve feeling or
emotion—not in the sense of passions, passivity, or change,
but feeling in some sense akin to those which we have,
which determine our will and action. It is
necessary to deny external determination in God's
pity, compassion, jealousy, hatred, love, and “repentance”;
but it is difficult to see how internal determined feelings
can be eliminated.
As
to the relative prominence or functional level of the various
faculties which God possesses, nothing in the Bible or in
Reformed theology indicates that any one is to be set
above the others. The Bible states with precisely
the same absolute force that God knows the end from
the beginning, that God is a jealous God, and that God
imparts gifts as he wills. The Westminster Shorter Catechism
makes no distinction when it says that God is infinite,
eternal, and unchangeable in his being and in all of his
attributes. It may seem that Hodge, in the above
quotation, subordinates volition to emotion, and
that in the following quotation he subordinates intellect to
volition:
“God
knows himself by the necessity of his nature; but as
everything out of himself depends for its existence or
occurrence upon his will, his knowledge of each
thing as an actual occurrence is suspended on his
will” (Systematic Theology, vol. I, p. 397).
However,
in each case Hodge is making no reference at all to a
difference of functional level, but only to a logical order
of economic succession. Reformed theology seems to be barren
of any references to a primacy of the intellect in
God. In fact, every indication is that whatever
distinguishable faculties exist in God are equally prominent,
equally significant, and of equal functional level. God is “a
personal Spirit, infinite, eternal, and illimitable alike in
His Being and in the intelligence, sensibility, and
will which belong to Him as a personal Spirit” (B.B.
Warfield: “God”, Studies in Theology, p. 111).
As
for human psychology and man's religious activity Dr. Clark's
position again seems to be at serious variance with Biblical,
confessional, and traditional statements. From the viewpoint
of abstract psychology, it is perfectly true that
Reformed theologians have not been in complete
agreement as to the number and names of the
faculties of the human soul. In speaking specifically of the
human soul Calvin mentions by name only the intellect and will
(Institutes, Book I, Chap. XV, Sect. 6).
Augustine refers to the perception, understanding, and will.
The more recent theologians, however, seem to agree in large
measure on the threefold distinction of intellect,
emotion, and will (Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, vol. III, p. 35; A.A. Hodge, Outlines of Theology, p. 217; Warfield, loc. cit.; Abraham Kuyper, Dictaten Dogmatiek, Vol. II, Locus de Homine,
pp. 68-88). There would also seem to be considerable
disagreement on the relations between the faculties: Calvin
bluntly says that “the intellect rules the will” (loc. cit.), while Bavinck (Gereforemeerde Dogmatiek, Vol.
I, pp. 227ff.) seems now and then to think in terms of a
primacy of the will. However, in both of these cases it
soon becomes clear that the reference is not to
functional levels; both Calvin and Bavinck insist on
the total activity of the human being in religion, with no
subordination of one faculty to another.
It
is specifically in the sphere of religious activity, then,
that the question of the relation of man's spiritual
faculties to each other must be settled. The
Christian, regenerated and effectually called by
God's Spirit, is active in faith, in repentance, and in
sanctification—though, of course, not exclusively nor intially
active. In each of these three activities, the clear
statements of the Reformed Faith are at variance with Dr.
Clark's views of intellection, as knowledge of propositions,
being man's highest religious activity.
As
for faith: The Westminster Confession, Chap. XIV, Section II,
says, “But the principle acts of saving faith are,
accepting, receiving, and resting upon Christ alone .
. .” This is in accord with Biblical language which speaks of
knowing Christ, receiving him, and hoping or
trusting in him. That “accepting” Christ has to do with
intellectual activity, “receiving” him with emotional activity
in relating him to our personal cases, and “resting upon”
him with volitional activity is the universal witness of
Reformed theology. A.A. Hodge combines all three in the
following quotation (Outlines of Theology, pp. 353-4):
“The
one indivisible soul knows and loves, desires and decides,
and these several acts of the soul meet on the same
object. The soul can neither love, desire nor choose that
which it does not know, nor can it know an object as
true or good without some affection of the will
towards it. Assent to a purely speculative truth may be simply
an act of understanding, but belief in a moral truth, in
testimony, in promises, must be a complex act, embracing
both the understanding and the will. The
understanding apprehends the truth to be believed, and
decides upon the validity of the evidence, but the disposition
to believe testimony, or moral evidence, has its
foundation in the will. Actual trust in a promise is an act of
the will, and not a simple judgment as to its
trustworthiness.”
Compare
this with Dr. Clark's statements that intellection is the
highest act of man, and that intellection consists in
knowing propositions such as “Two plus two equals
four”.
An
even clearer statement of the equal function of
man's various faculties in faith is given by
Warfield (“On Faith in its Psychological Aspects”, Studies in Theology, pp. 337, 338-9, 340-341):
“The
mode of the divine giving of faith . . . proceeds by the
divine illumination of the understanding,
softening of the heart, and quickening of
the will [cf. Westminster
Shorter Catechism, Q. 31]. . . . Man . . . is conscious
of his dependence on God. . . . In unfallen
man, the consciousness of dependence on God
is far from a bare recognition of a fact; it has a rich
emotional result in the heart. This emotional product of
course includes fear, in the sense of awe and reverence.
But its peculiar quality is just active and
loving trust. Sinless man delights to be
dependent on God and trusts Him wholly. . . . In this
spontaneous trust of sinless man we have faith at its
purest . . .
“In
accordance with the nature of this faith the Protestant
theologians have generally explained that
faith includes in itself the three elements
of notitia, assensus, fiducia.
Their primary object has been, no doubt, to protest
against the Romish conception which limits faith to the
assent of the understanding. [!] The stress of the
Protestant definition lies therefore upon
the fiducial element. This stress has not led
Protestant theologians generally, however, to eliminate
from the conception of faith the elements of understanding
and assent. . . . In every movement of faith, therefore,
from the lowest to the highest, there is an
intellectual, an emotional, and a voluntary
element, though naturally these elements vary in their
relative prominence in the several movements of faith. . .
.
The
central movement in all faith is no doubt the element of
assent. . . . But the movement of assent
must depend, as it always does depend, on a
movement, not specifically of the will, but of the
intellect; the assensus issues from the notitia.
The movement of the sensibilities which we call 'trust',
is on the contrary the product of assent.
And it is in this movement of the
sensibilities that faith fulfills itself, and it is by it
that, as specifically 'faith', it is 'formed'”.
As
for repentance: The Shorter Catechism could not be more
clear in regard to the three aspects of man's soul
being active in repentance (Q. 87):
“Repentance
unto life is a saving grace, whereby a sinner,
out of a true sense of his sin, and apprehension of the
mercy of God in Christ, doth, with grief and hatred of his
sin, turn from it unto God, with full purpose
of, and endeavor after, new obedience.”
If
a sense of sin and apprehension of God's mercy are not
intellectual, if grief and hatred are not emotional,
and if turning with purpose and endeavor is not
volitional, then words do not mean anything; and
these are all equally “high” aspects of this particularly
religious activity of men. 2 Corinthians 7:8-11
includes precisely the same elements: the
knowledge of sin instilled by Paul's first
epistle, godly sorrow for sin (accompanied by indignation,
fear, longing, and zeal) and an earnest care which
manifested itself in clearing themselves and
avenging the wrong done. Again, there are three
equally important and lofty functions in repentance:
intellectual, emotional, and volitional.
As
for sanctification: “we are renewed in the whole man after
the image of God” (Shorter Catechism, Q. 35).
Sanctification is, in a sense, continual or
repeated repentance, so far as man's activity in
it is concerned. Accordingly, all that has been said about
repentance applies here with equal force. There is an
important additional point, however, and that has to do with
the specific words that we are “renewed in the
whole man after the image of God”. That very work was begun
and, in it essential form, accomplished in
regeneration. In regeneration the original moral image of
God, consisting of knowledge, righteousness, and holiness,
was restored to us. Sanctification is a
continual progress toward that image in our
outwards lives. But if that process includes intellect,
emotion, and will, then surely we would expect to find all
three of those aspects in the image of God in
man. The conclusion is justified: we find
precisely that in Biblical language and in Reformed
theology. Just as God has those three faculties, so man,
created in God's image, has them. Man is
intellectually created in God's image, emotionally
created in God's image, volitionally created in God's image.
A
recollection of Dr. Clark's forthright denial of anything
that might be “emotion” in God, cited above, will
thus impress us that he not only does violence
to the Scriptural and Reformed doctrine of man's
religious life, but also to the tremendously important
doctrine of God's creation of man in his own image. To
defend the doctrine of God, to defend the
doctrine of creation, to defend the doctrines of
salvation, we must protest against any sympathy toward this
idea of the “primacy” of the intellect.
As
for man's religious activity in a more general way,
Reformed Theology is equally vigorous in
upholding the equal importance of all man's
faculties. The Westminster Shorter Catechism
tells us that “man's chief end is to glorify
God and to enjoy him forever”; we are to learn how to do
this from the Bible alone, and the Bible teaches “what
man is to believe concerning God and what
duty God requires of man” (Qs. 1-3). Obviously duty, which
is volitional if anything, is placed side by
side with knowledge, and that duty is “obedience to his
revealed will” (Q. 39), again a matter of volition. The
sum of that obedience is love. (Q. 42), which just might
be an emotion; and even if it is not an
emotion, we are to love God with our heart, which is
the best Scriptural indication of emotion.
Calvin,
who so clearly gives the intellect a control over will,
though not by virtue of that a primacy over
will, speaks along the same line (Institutes, Bk. I, Ch. II):
“Properly speaking, we cannot say that God is known where there is
no religion or piety. . . . By piety I mean that union of
reverence and love to God which the
knowledge of his benefits inspires. For
until men feel that they owe everything to God, that they
are cherished by his paternal care, and that he is the
author of all their blessings, so that
nought is to be looked for away from him,
they will never submit to him in voluntary obedience; nay,
unless they place their entire happiness in him, they
will never yield up their whole selves to
him in truth and sincerity.
“The effect of our knowledge rather ought to be, first, to teach us reverence and fear; and secondly,
to induce us, under its guidance and teaching, to ask
every good thing from him, and, when it is
received, ascribe it to him. For how can the
idea of God enter your mind without instantly giving rise
to the thought, that since you are his workmanship, you
are bound, by the very law of creation, to
submit to his authority?—that your life is
due to him?—that whatever you do ought to have reference
to him? If so, it undoubtedly follows that your life is
sadly corrupted, it it is not framed in obedience to him,
since his will ought to be the law of our
lives. On the other hand, your idea of his
nature is not clear unless you acknowledge him to be the
origin and fount of all goodness. Hence would arise both
confidence in him, and a desire of cleaving
to him, did not the depravity of the human
mind lead it away from the proper course of investigation.
. . . He by whom God is thus known, perceiving how he
governs all things, confides in him as his
guardian and protector, and casts himself
entirely upon his faithfulness,—perceiving him to be the
source of every blessing, if he is in any strait or feels
any want, he instantly recurs to his
protection and trusts to his aid,—persuaded
that he is good and merciful, he reclines upon him with
sure confidence . . . —acknowledging him as his Father and
his Lord, he considers himself bound to
have respect to his authority in all things,
to reverence his majesty, aim at the advancement of his
glory, and obey his commands,—regarding him as a just
judge . . . , he keeps the judgment seat always
in his view. . . .
“Such is pure and and genuine religion, namely, confidence in God coupled with serious fear.”
Pure
and genuine religion is not, then, merely intellectual
apprehension of propositional truths.
So also Bavinck (Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, Vol. I, pp. 276-277):
“The
result is, therefore, that religion is not limited to but
one of man's faculties, but pervades the
whole man. The relationship to God is a
total and central relationship. We must love God with all
our mind and with all our soul and with all our strength.
Precisely because God is God he claims us
completely in body and soul, with all our
faculties and in all our relations. To be sure, there is
also order in this relationship of man to God. Here also
each faculty exists and works in man
according to its own nature. Knowledge is
first; there is no true service of God without true
knowledge: ignoti nulla cupido,
Unknown is unloved. He who goes to God must believe that
he is the rewarder of them that seek him: Hebrews 11:6. Belief cometh from hearing: Romans 10:13, 14.
The heathen came to ungodliness and
unrighteousness, because they did not retain God in their
knowledge: Romans 1:18f.
But the knowledge of God works itself out in the heart
and awakens there all sorts of emotions of fear and hope,
despair and joy, guilt and forgiveness, misery
and release, as the whole Scripture
witnesses, particularly in the Psalms. And through the
heart it works in turn on the will; faith reveals itself
in love, in works: James 1:27, 1 John 1:5-7; Romans 2:10-13; Galatians 5:6,
1 Corinthians 13:1f, etc. Head, heart and hand work
together, each in its own way, taken captive
by religion; religion takes the whole man,
body and soul, into her service.”
Cf. also Deuteronomy. 29:29:
“the things that are revealed belong unto
us and to our children, that we man do all the works of
this law”.
“The
knowledge of God, which is set before us in the
Scriptures, is designed for the same purpose as that
which shines in creation, viz., that we may
thereby learn to worship him with perfect integrity and
unfeigned obedience, and also to depend entirely on his
goodness” (Calvin, Institutes, Bk. I, Ch. X, Sect. 2).
It
may be said, indeed, that the whole glorious climax of
the covenant relationship which is so
essential a part of the Reformed Faith is,
as witnessed by Scripture, our standards, and Reformed
writers, obedience
to God. This is still no “primacy” of the will or of any
other faculty; it is simply an eminently
Reformed statement of the nature of the
Christian's religious activity. It certainly goes far
beyond an exaltation of the apprehension of propositions.
It
may be noted that the discussion so far has assumed
throughout that the religious man in question is a
Christian, regenerated by God. The assumption has
constantly been that the unregenerate man is
polluted in every thought, every emotion, and every act of
his will. Precisely here must be raised a final objection
to Dr. Clark's view of the primacy of the intellect. Dr.
Clark does not deny the necessity or the
fact of regeneration but he makes no absolute
qualitative distinction between the knowledge of the
unregenerate man and the knowledge of the regenerate man.
With the same ease, the same “common sense”,
the unregenerate and the regenerate man can
understand propositions revealed to man (p. 20; 28:13-16;
31:13-17; 34:13-35:2).
The
result is simply this, that all men have a certain amount
of religious activity, some more and some
less, some with more falsehood mixed in and
some with less, but all with some; there is not one
shred of evidence that man's religious activity undergoes
any qualitative change through regeneration. That
bears all the earmarks of rationalism,
humanistic intellectualism. It seems to share the
very same vicious independence from God that obtains in
the voluntarism and emotionalism to which Dr. Clark is
so unalterably opposed.
To
sum up briefly a few of the conclusions of this section,
Dr. Clark's view of the primacy of the
intellect is at serious variance with
Scripture, with our standards, and with recognized
Reformed writings, not only in the general concept of
human psychology or of man's religious
activity, but specifically in the doctrine of God's
spiritual nature, in the doctrine of the image of God in
man, in the doctrine of man's spiritual nature, in
the doctrines of faith, repentance, and
sanctification, in the doctrine of the covenant, in
the doctrine of sin, particularly as regards its noetic
effects, and in all the ethical implications of
these doctrines. The variance is no minor
matter; it is the product of a rationalistic dialectic.
The approval or overlooking of such a variance is a matter
of the utmost gravity.
III.
Dr. Clark Asserts that the relationship of divine
sovereignty and human responsibility to each other
presents no difficulty for his thinking and that the two
are easily reconcilable before the bar of human reason. He
expresses surprise that so many theologians find an insuperable
difficulty here. In his second examination little was
said on this matter (3:11-4:7; 47:13-16), but in the first
examination it received considerable attention. Reference was
then made to Dr. Clark's article “Determinism and
Responsibility”, which appeared in the January 15, 1932, issue
of The Evangelical Quarterly.
In that article he said that it had been stated by
his denomination—at that time The Presbyterian
Church in the U.S.A.—“that the reconciliation of man's free
agency and God's sovereignty is an inscrutable mystery”,
but he added: “Rather the mystery is—recognizing that God is
the ultimate cause of man's nature—how the Calvinistic
solution could have been so long overlooked” (p.
16). In the first examination he made the remark
that the Stoics had already solved this problem.
It
needs hardly to be said that “the lazy man's argument” does
not hold. In other words, the fact that God
foreordained from all that comes to pass in time,
and in his providence brings it to pass without fail, does not
deprive man of freedom and thus absolve him from
all responsibility. To say that it does is to destroy the
problem. An obvious truth, on which all Reformed theologians
are agreed, is that the exercise of human freedom is itself
included in the divine decree of foreordination; in a
word, that this decree embraces means as well as
ends. There is also perfect agreement among Reformed
theologians on the presupposition that human responsibility
is a corollary of divine sovereignty; that is, that
man is responsible to God because God is sovereign. Again, not
one Reformed theologian teaches that divine sovereignty and
human responsibility are actually contradictory. However
contradictory they may seem to the finite and
sin-darkened minds of men, both are taught
unmistakably in Holy Writ, and this must mean that for the
mind of God they are perfectly harmonious.
Nevertheless
Reformed theologians readily grant that there are
difficulties here which they are unable to solve. L.
Berkhof has stated succinctly one aspect of the
problem. Speaking of the fact that God not only planned all
events from eternity but also brings them to pass by his
providence, he says:
Pelagians,
Semi-Pelagians, and Arminians raise a serious objection to
this doctrine of providence. They maintain that a
previous concurrence, which is not merely general
but predetermines man to specific actions,
makes God the responsible author of sin. Reformed
theologians are well aware of the difficulty that
presents itself here, but do not feel free to
circumvent it by denying God's absolute control over the free
actions of His moral creatures, since this is clearly taught
in Scripture (Systematic Theology, Second Revised and Enlarged Edition, 1941, p. 174).
Berkhof
admits the difficulty, but, instead of seeking to solve it,
is content to abide by the plain teaching of Scripture. The
greatest Reformed theologians have always done
likewise.
After setting forth the doctrine of reprobation Paul says in Romans 9:19,
“Thou wilt say then unto me, why doth he yet find fault? The
point of this objection to the apostolic teaching is
that divine sovereignty as manifested in reprobation leaves
no room for human responsibility. Paul's answer
begins: “Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against
God?” (Romans 9:20). Calvin comments:
In
this first answer he does nothing else but beat down impious
blasphemy by an argument taken from the condition of man: he
will presently subjoin another by which he will clear
the righteousness of God from all blame.
He proceeds:
But
they who say that Paul, wanting reason, had recourse to
reproof, cast a grievous calumny on the Holy Spirit: for
the things calculated to vindicate God's justice,
and ready at hand, he was at first unwilling to
adduce, for they could not have been comprehended; yea, he so
modifies his second reason, that he does not undertake a full
defense, but in such a manner as to give a sufficient
demonstration of God's justice, if it be considered by us
with devout humility and reverence.
And then Calvin says:
He
reminds man of what is especially meet for him to remember,
that is, of his own condition; as though he had
said,—“Since thou art man, thou ownest thyself to be
dust and ashes; why then dost thou contend with the
Lord about that which thou art not able to understand?” In a
word, the Apostle did not bring forward what might have been
said, but what is suitable to our ignorance. Proud men
clamour, because Paul, admitting that men are rejected or
chosen by the secret counsel of God, alleges no
cause; as though the Spirit of God were silent for
want of reason, and not rather, that by his silence he
reminds us, that a mystery which our minds cannot comprehend
ought to be reverently adored, and that he thus checks the
wantonness of human curiosity. Let uss then know,
that God does for no other reason refrain from
speaking, but that he sees that we cannot contain his
immense wisdom in our small measure; and thus regarding our
weakness, he leads us to moderation and sobriety.
It
is evident that Paul, instead of seeking to reconcile divine
sovereignty and human responsibility by means of human logic,
silences those who regard them as contradictory by a strong
assertion of divine sovereignty. It is equally clear
that Calvin follows faithfully in the apostle's footsteps.
In perfect harmony with his comment on Romans 9:19, 20 is Calvin's comment on the rhetorical question of Romans 11:34, “Who has known the mind of the Lord?” Says Calvin:
If
anyone will seek to know more than what God has revealed, he
shall be overwhelmed with the immeasurable
brightness of inaccessible light. But we must bear in mind the
distinction, which I have before mentioned, between
the secret counsel of God, and his will made known
in Scripture; for though the whole doctrine of Scripture
surpasses in its height the mind of man, yet an access to it
is not closed against the faithful, who reverently
and soberly follow the Spirit as their guide; but
the cause is different with regard to his hidden counsel,
the depth and height of which cannot by any investigation be
reached.
In his Gereformeerde Dogmatiek part I, p. 115, Geerhardus Vos compares the teaching of Romans 9:1-29 with that of Romans 9:30-10:21. He says:
For
the apostle both are certain: the free, sovereign counsel of
God, which does not derive its motives from the
works of man, and the full responsibility of man to
his Creator. He discusses both in order. An attempt to
reconcile the two logically with each other the apostle
has not made. And we too may make no such attempt. But it is
much more reprehensible still so to pervert and distort the
content of Romans 9:1-29
as to fit it somehow into what follows. Both sides
must stand next to each other, unreconciled for our thinking,
but each in its full right. To wish to explain Romans 9 from
Romans 10 is rationalistic exegesis.
In his Outlines of Theology,
pp. 221f., A. A. Hodge considers the contention that the
Reformed doctrine of predestination is inconsistent with
the liberty and accountability of man. He says:
Paul
answers this objection by condescending to no appeal to human
reason, but simply (1) by asserting God's
sovereignty as Creator, and man's dependence as
creature, and (2) by asserting the just exposure of all
men alike to wrath as sinners.
The reference is to Romans 9:20-24. Elsewhere he says:
We
have the fact distinctly revealed that God has decreed the
free acts of men, and yet that the actors were none
the less responsible, and consequently none the less
free in their acts.—Acts 2:23; 3:18; 4:27, 28; Genesis 50:20, etc. We never can understand how
the infinite God acts upon the finite spirit of man, but it
is none the less our duty to believe (p. 210).
Abraham Kuyper comments in his Dictaten Dogmatiek, Locus de Deo, part 3, p. 108, on Matthew 26:24,
“The Son of man goeth as it is written of him: but
woe unto that man by whom the Son of man is
betrayed: it had been good for that man if he had not been
born”. Says this outspoken supralapsarian:
Jesus says three things here: (1) this crime with reference to me must be committed, (2) he who is to commit this crime will suffer eternal condemnation, (3) to prevent that he should not have been born and he was born according to the decree. However man may talk, the fact that this culminating sin was included in the decree
is not only taught definitely in Holy Scripture by
apostles and prophets, but by the Lord Jesus
himself, while he who commits this sin, far from being innocent, is punished with everlasting damnation.
After these two have been placed alongside each other, the
Lord Jesus ventures no attempt at solution; on the contrary,
he confronts his disciples still more pointedly with
the impenetrability of the mystery by saying: “It
had been good for that man if he had not been born.”
Here
then is a situation which is inadequately described as amazing.
There is a problem which has baffled the greatest theologians
of history. Not even Holy Scripture offers a solution. But Dr.
Clark asserts unblushingly that for his thinking the
problem has ceased being a problem. Here is something
phenomenal. What accounts for it? The most charitable, and no
doubt the correct, explanation is that Dr. Clark has
come under the spell of rationalism. It is difficult indeed to
escape the conclusion that by his refusal to permit the
scriptural teaching of divine sovereignty and the scriptural
teaching of human responsibility to stand alongside each
other and by his claim that he has fully reconciled them with
each other before the bar of human reason Dr. Clark has fallen
into the error of rationalism. To be sure, he is not a
rationalist in the sense that he substitutes human reason for
divine revelation as such. But, to say nothing of his finding
the solution of the problem of the relation to each
other of divine sovereignty and human responsibility in the
teaching of pagan philosophers who were totally ignorant
of the teaching of Holy Writ on either of these subjects, it
is clear that Dr. Clark regards Scripture from the viewpoint of
a system which to the mind of man must be harmonious in
all its parts. The inevitable outcome is rationalism in the
interpretation of Scripture. And that too is rationalism.
Although Dr. Clark does not claim actually to possess at
the present moment the solution of every Scriptural
paradox, yet his rationalism leaves room at best for only
a temporary subjection of human reason to the divine Word.
The
history of doctrine tells us that the view under discussion is
far from innocent. The tenet that divine sovereignty and
human responsibility are logically reconcilable has been held
by two schools of thought, both of which claimed to be Reformed
but neither of which was recognized as Reformed by the
Reformed churches. One of these schools is Arminianism.
It meant to uphold both divine sovereignty and human
responsibility, especially the latter, but in its
rationalistic attempt to harmonize the two it did great violence
to the former. The other school is Antinomianism. It also meant
to uphold both divine sovereignty and human
responsibility, especially the former, but in its
rationalistic attempt to harmonize the two it did great
violence to the latter. Dr. Abraham Kuyper has described
Antinomianism as “dreadful sin which occurs almost exclusively
in the Reformed churches”. He says that what accounts for this
phenomenon is a one-sided emphasis in much Reformed preaching on
God's decretive will at the expense of his preceptive will. He
deems it essential to hold that Scripture dinstinguishes
between the sphere of divine sovereignty and the sphere
of human responsibility and “that this dinstinction is so
absolute that one can never pass from the one into the
other” (Dictaten Dogmatiek, Locus de Deo,
part 3, pp. 113f.). In light of history we cannot but hold
that his rationalism exposes Dr. Clark to the peril of
Antinomianism.
Here
attention must be called to his treatment of human
responsibility in the article “Determinism and
Responsibility”. Reformed theologians generally are
exceedingly circumspect when they discuss the
relation of the divine decree and divine providence to the sin
of man. There is excellent reason for their carefulness. They
are zealous to maintain God's holiness as well as his
sovereignty, and they are just as zealous, while
upholding divine sovereignty, not to detract, after
the manner of the Antinomians, from human responsibility. But
Dr. Clark says boldy: “Does the view here proposed make God
the Author of sin? Why the learned divines who
formulated the various creeds so uniformly permitted such a
metaphorical expression to becloud the issue is a puzzle. This
view most certainly makes God the First and Ultimate Cause of
everything. But very slight reflection on the definition of
responsibility and its implication of a superior
authority shows that God is not responsible for sin” (p. 22).
It It is meaningful that Dr. Clark is not careful to
say, as so many Reformed theologians are, that God
is not the efficient cause of sin (e.g. Berkhof, Systematic Theology, p. 108.
Dr. Clark adds significantly:
It
follows from this that determinism is consistent with
responsibility and the concept of freedom which was introduced
only to guarantee responsibility is useless. Of course man is
still a “free agent” for that merely means, as Hodge says, that
man has the power to make a decision. It is difficult to
understand then, why so much effort should be wasted in
the attempt to make the power of deciding consistent
with the certainty of deciding. If there be any mystery
about it, as the Brief Statement says, it is one of the
theologian's own choosing. For God both gives the power and
determines how it shall be used. God is Sovereign (p. 22).
To
sever human responsibility from human freedom, as is here
done, is a serious departure from generally accepted
Reformed theology. Charles Hodge says that a truth
“of which every man is convinced from the very
constitution of his nature” is “that none but free agents can
be accountable for their character or conduct” (Systematic Theology,
vol. II, p. 293). He contends further that the
Bible teaches “that man is a free and responsible
agent, because he is the author of his own acts, and
because he is determined to act by nothing out of himself” (p.
307). But Dr. Clark contends without qualification that God
both gives the power of deciding “and determines how it shall
be used”. The Westminster Confession of Faith also links
together human liberty and human responsibility when
it says “God from eternity did by the most wise and
holy counsel of his own will, freely and
unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass: yet so as
thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence
offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the
liberty or contingency of second causes taken away,
but rather established” (III, I).
To be sure, the term “responsibility” is not employed
here, as is the term “liberty”, but in the statement that God
is not the author of sin it is plainly implied that man is
the author of sin and hence responsible for it.
We
conclude, in spite of Dr. Clark's professed adherence
to chapter III, section I, of the Confession (3:11-19), that his
rationalism has resulted in his departing from the historic
Reformed doctrine of human responsibility. In his attempt to
reconcile by human reason divine sovereignty and human
responsibility he has done decided violence to the
latter.
IV.
In the course of Dr. Clark's examination by Presbytery it
became abundantly clear that his rationalism keeps him
from doing justice to the precious teaching of Scripture that in
the gospel God sincerely offers salvation in Christ to all who
hear, reprobate as well as elect, and that he has no pleasure in
any one's rejecting this offer but, contrariwise, would
have all who hear accept it and be saved.
Dr.
Clark constantly speaks of the gospel as a command. That it
is a command permits of no doubt. But only
reluctantly does he admit that the gospel is also an
offer and an invitation (8:9, 10; 23:5-24;
48:21-25). This is strange, to say the least. The Westminster
Confession of Faith (VII, III) say that in the covenant of
grace God “freely offereth
unto sinners life and salvation by Jesus Christ”. And the
Shorter Catechism (Q. 86) defines faith in Jesus Christ
as “a saving grace, whereby we receive and rest
upon him alone for salvation, as he is offered to us in the gospel”.
Dr. Clark stedfastly refuses to describe as sincere the offer which God makes to sinners in the gospel (e.g.,
7:8-15; 10:10-18; 24:3f.). This is surpassing strange. To be
sure, the Westminster standards do not employ the
word sincere
in this connection; but is it not a foregone conclusion that
the offer is sincere? Would it not be blasphemy to deny this?
For that very reason there was no need of the
Westminster divines' describing the gospel offer as
sincere. Its sincerity goes without saying. But
obviously that is not Dr. Clark's reason for refusing to
characterize it as sincere.
When
the Arminian controversy was at its height the Reformed
churches faced a different situation. It was contended
emphatically by the Arminians that the Reformed doctrine of
reprobation rules out the sincerity of God's offer of salvation
to the reprobate and that, consequently, the Reformed faith has a
gospel only for the elect. Precisely the sincerity of
the gospel offer was now at issue. And so we find the
Synod of Dort, which was summoned to deal with the
Arminian heresy and which consisted of representatives of the
Reformed churches of almost all of Europe, declaring
unmistakably and emphatically:
As
many as are called by the gospel are unfeignedly
called. For God hath most earnestly and truly
declared in his Word what will be acceptable to him; namely,
that all who are called should comply with the invitation
(Third and Fourth Heads of Doctrine, art. 8).
In
the course of his examination Dr. Clark did indeed express
agreement with this teaching of Dort (24:5-20), but he made
it clear in doing so he conceived of the gospel as a
command (48:24-49:9. See also 8:9f.). He said that it is the
preceptive will of God that those who hear shall believe
the gospel, and it is “acceptable” to God that they do
so because he insists on being obeyed. But the Synod of Dort
obviously meant much
more than that when it employed the word “acceptable”.
That appears from its description of the gospel as an
invitation, from its insistence that all who are called are
called “unfeignedly”, as well as from the fact that
it was refuting the Arminian contention that the
Reformed faith leaves no room for a sincere offer of salvation
made by God to the reprobate. What the authors of the
Canons had in mind was that God has “no pleasure in the death
of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and
live” (Ezekiel 33:11).
In
this connection reference must again be made to Dr.
Clark's view that God has no emotions. If this definition of
emotions be granted, God certainly has none. But at this point
in the examination it appeared that Dr. Clark regards God as
being without feelings of any kind. He denied emphatically that
Ezekiel 33:11
and the statement in the Canons of Dort which was just
discussed can have any reference to emotions in God, for God has
no emotions (49:15-50:1). See also 29:11f.). Clearly Dr. Clark
is consistent here in his rationalism.
The
reason for Dr. Clark's failure to do justice to the
aspect of the gospel under discussion is apparent. He
believes—as do we all—the doctrine of reprobation. But he cannot
allow of any conception of the gospel which to his
thinking might do the slightest violence to this
doctrine. Thus he is compelled to bring his view of the
gospel into harmony with this doctrine. Having done that, he can
say, as he does, that he sees no logical conflict whatever
between the gospel and reprobation. In a word, his
rationalism does not permit him to let the two stand
unreconciled alongside each other. Rather than do that he would
modify the gospel in the interest of reprobation.
Otherwise expressed, he makes the same error as does the
Arminian, although he moves in the opposite direction. The
Arminian cannot harmonize the divine reprobation with the
sincere divine offer of salvation to all who hear; hence he
rejects the former. Neither can Dr. Clark harmonize the two, and
so he detracts from the latter. Rationalism accounts
for both errors.
It
is not difficult to show that both Calvin and the
outstanding Reformed theologians of recent times stressed, on
the basis of Holy Scripture, which is the primary standard of
The Orthodox Presbyterian Church, the sincerity of the divine
offer of salvation in the case of all to whom it comes,
the reprobate as well as the elect, even though these
theologians confessed to their inability to harmonize this view
of the gospel with the scriptural teaching of
reprobation.
Ezekiel 18:23 reads:
Have
I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die? saith
the Lord God?; and not that he should return from his ways, and
live?
Calvin comments:
God
desires nothing more earnestly than that those who
were perishing and rushing to destruction should
return into the way of safety. And for this reason not only is
the Gospel spread abroad in the world, but God
wished to bear witness through all ages how inclined he is to
pity . . . What the prophet now says is very true, that God
wills not the death of a sinner, because he meets
him of his own accord, and is not only prepared to
receive all who fly to his pity, but he calls them
towards him with a loud voice, when sees how they are
alienated from all hope of safety . . . If one again
objects—this is making God act with duplicity, the
answer is ready, that God always
wishes the same thing, though by different ways, and in a
manner inscrutable to us. Although, therefore, God's
will is simple, yet great variety is involved in it,
so far as our senses are concerned. Besides, it is not
surprising that our eyes should be blinded by
intense light, so that we cannot certainly judge how God
wishes all to be saved, and yet has devoted all the reprobate
to eternal destruction, and wishes them to perish.
In 1 Peter 3:9 it is said that the Lord is “not willing than any should perish, but that all should come to repentance”.
Says Calvin:
So
wonderful is his love towards mankind, that he would
have them all to be saved, and is of his own self prepared to
bestow salvation on the lost . . . But it may be asked, If God
wishes none to perish, why is it that so many do perish?
To this my answer is, that no mention is here made of
the hidden purpose of God, according to which the
reprobate are doomed to their own ruin, but only of his
will as made known to us in the gospel. For God there stretches
forth his hand without a difference to all, but lays hold only
of those, to lead them to himself, whom he has chosen before the
foundation of the world”.
In Matthew 23:37 Christ, addressing Jerusalem, says
How
often would I have gathered thy children together, even
as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would
not!
Calvin remarks:
We now perceive the reason why Christ, speaking in the person of God, compares himself to a hen
. . . By this he means that, whenever the Word of God
is exhibited to us, he opens his bosom to us with
maternal kindness, and, not satisfied with this,
condescends to the humble affection of a hen watching over her chickens.
In his volume Calvin on Common Grace
Herman Kuiper enumerates a long list of passages in John's
gospel, to take but a single book, in which Calvin finds
“the idea that God invites both elect and reprobate men
to salvation and offers salvation to all men
promiscuously”. The list follows: John 1:6; 1:11; 1:29; 1:36, 37; 1:43; 3:14, 15; 3:16; 3:17, 18; 3:36; 4:19; 5:35; 5:40; 6:31, 32; 6:36; 6:49, 50; 6:66; 8:21; 12:47, 48; 15:22; 17:3; 20:23 (p. 148). The same writer puts the question:
How
can it be said that God is solicitous for the salvation of and
wills the repentance of those whom he has predestinated to
everlasting perdition in His eternal counsel?
Speaking
of Calvin's teaching of reprobation on the one hand and
on the other of his teaching of the sincere offer of salvation
to all to whom the gospel comes, he asserts:
We
may as well try to budge a mountain of solid granite
with our finger as endeavor to harmonize these declarations.
He reasons on:
Must
we then conclude that Calvin taught that God has a
double will and is at variance with Himself? Our author [Calvin]
expressly declares that he emphatically repudiates the view that
God has more than one will. He explicitly teaches that we must
not think that God has a double will. God does not in
Himself will opposites. But it is impossible for us to
comprehend and fathom the Most High. To our apprehension the
will of God is manifold. As far as we can see, God does
will what seems to be opposed to His will.
Kuiper concludes:
In
short, Calvin makes it plain that in his view the
paradoxes which we have just reviewed are paradoxes involved in
the teaching of Holy Scripture itself (pp. 223f.).
In his Systematic Theology, vol. II, p. 644, Charles Hodge says:
It
is further said to be inconsistent with the sincerity
of God, to offer salvation to those whom he has predetermined to
leave to the just recompense of their sins. It is enough to say
in answer to this objection, so strenuously urged by Lutherans
and Arminians, that is bears with equal force against the
doctrine of God's foreknowledge, which they admit to be
an essential attribute of his nature . . . There is no
real difficulty in either case except what is purely
subjective. It is in us, in our limited and partial
apprehensions; and in our inability to comprehend the ways of
our God, which are past finding out.
And after quoting 1 Timothy 2:3, 4,
“God our Saviour, who will have all men to be saved,
and to come unto the knowledge of the truth”, together
with Ezekiel 33:11, he says:
God
forbid that any man should teach anything inconsistent with
these precious declarations of the Word of God. They clearly
teach that God is a benevolent Being; that He delights
not in the sufferings of his creatures . . . God pities even the
wicked whom He condemns, as a father pities the disobedient
child whom He chastises. And as the father can truthfully and
with a full heart say that he delights not in the
sufferings of his child, so our Father in heaven can
say, that He delights not in the death of the wicked (p.
651).
Says Herman Bavinck in his Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, vol. IV, p. 7:
Although
through calling salvation becomes the portion of but a
few, . . . it [calling] nevertheless has great value and
significance for those also who reject it. It is for all without
exception proof of God's infinite love and it seals the
statement that He has no pleasure in the death of the sinner,
but therein that he turn and live.
In The Christian View of Man, pp. 74f., J. Gresham Machen says:
The
doctrine of predestination does not mean that God
rejoices in the death of a sinner. The Bible distinctly says the
contrary. Hear that great verse in the thirty-third chapter of
Ezekiel: 'As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in
the death of the wicked; but that the wicked turn from his way
and live.
He goes on to say that in his opinion 1 Timothy 2:4 “means very much what that great Ezekiel passage means”.
Berkhof in his Systematic Theology, pp. 460ff., upholds both the universality and the sincerity of the gospel invitation. He says:
It
is not confined to any age or nation or class of men. It comes
to both the just and the unjust, the elect and the reprobate.
He offers as irrefutable proof Isaiah 45:22,
“Look unto me, and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth; for I
am God, and there is none else”. He proceeds:
The
external calling is a calling in good faith, a calling that is
seriously meant. It is not an invitation coupled with the hope
that it will not be accepted. When God calls the sinner to
accept Christ by faith He earnestly desires this; and when
He promises those who repent and believe eternal life, His
promise is dependable. This follows from the very nature, from
the veracity, of God. It is blasphemous to think that
God would be guilty of equivocation and deception, that He would
say one thing and mean another, that He would earnestly plead
with the sinner to repent and believe unto salvation,
and at the same time not desire it in any sense of the
word.
And
when faced with the objection that according to this
doctrine God offers the forgiveness of sins and eternal life to
those for whom he has not intended these gifts, Berkhof admits
frankly that there is “a real difficulty” at this point,
but insists that it may not be assumed that there is a
contradiction.
Incidentally
it maybe remarked here that when, in 1924, one of the
very few churches in this country which takes the Reformed
faith seriously deposed certain ministers of the gospel, one
ground, among others, for this action was the denial by these
ministers of the sincerity of the divine offer of
salvation to all men.
The
supreme importance for evangelism of maintaining the
Reformed doctrine of the gospel as a universal and sincere offer
of salvation is self evident.
Again
we are confronted by a situation which is inadequately
described as amazing. Once more there is a problem which has
left the greatest theologians of history baffled. The very
Word of God does not present a solution. But Dr. Clark asserts
unblushingly that for his thinking the difficulty is
non-existent (35:20-36:2; 47:1f.). Here is something phenomenal.
What accounts for it? The most charitable, and no doubt
the correct, explanation is that Dr. Clark has fallen
under the spell of rationalism. Rather than subject his
reason to the divine Word he insists on logically
harmonizing with each other two evident but seemingly
contradictory teachings of that Word, although in the process he
detracts from one of these teachings.
The
conclusion is inescapable that Dr. Clark's rationalism has
resulted in his obscuring—to say the very least—a
signficant teaching of Scripture—a truth which constitutes one
off the most glorious aspects of the gospel of the grace of God.
* * *
It
will appear from the above examination of the views of
Dr. Clark as they were propounded to the Presbytery of
Philadelphia that these errors are far from being peripheral.
The very doctrine of God is undermined by a failure to maintain a
qualitative distinction between the knowledge of God and the
knowledge possible to man, thus denying the doctrine of the
incomprehensibility of God and impinging in a most serious
fashion upon the transcendence of the Creator over the creature.
The interpretation of Christianity as being fundamentally
intellectualism subordinates the volition to the intellect in
a manner that is flagrantly in violation of the teaching of
Scripture and of the Reformed theology. Similarly emotion as an
element in the mind of God and in the mind of the
Christian is disallowed. And the views concerning human
responsibility and of the free offer of the gospel
likewise clearly affect decisively one's conception of matter
that are of the greatest possible moment to every Christian.
Nor
do these errors concern only isolated details. In all
of these matters there is manifest a rationalistic approach to
Christian theology. The highest activity in man is the
intellectual activity; his highest goal is the intellectual
contemplation of God. In connection with his answer to the
question as to the extent to which man may comprehend
God, Clark admits the dependence of man upon the
revelation of God but, on the basis of a rationalistic
dialectic, maintains that any knowledge that man possesses of
any item must coincide with God's knowledge of the same item in
order to be true knowledge, thus failing to distinguish
between the Creator's knowledge of any thing and creaturely
knowledge of the same thing. And, even though he speaks of the
infinity of God's knowledge, he does not rise above a
quantitative distinction between the content of the
knowledge of God and the content of the knowledge which man may
possess. And in pursuance of his effort to penetrate into the
mind of God he sets aside, or attempts to set aside, by
resort to reason, the paradoxes which Reformed theology
has recognized as existing for the human mind between
the divine foreordination and human responsibility and between
predestination and the divine offer of salvation to all
men, with the consequences that the doctrines of human
responsibility and of the free offer of salvation to all fail
to be set forth in any adequate way. These innovations are then
not curiosities of an innocent sort, but concern some of
the most central doctrines of the Christian faith,
including even the all-decisive subject of the doctrine
of God. And the result of this rationalistic approach to
theology is a failure to maintain the balanced, comprehensively
Biblical, character of historic, classic Calvinism
which is set forth in the standards of The Orthodox Presbyterian
Church.
In
bringing this complaint to the attention of the Presbytery of
Philadelphia, the complainants further petition the
Presbytery to make amends as follows:
If the Presbytery is not ready to acknowledge that the meeting of July 7th
was illegal and that all of its acts and decisions are
therefore null and void, the complainants request that
it acknowledge that various views of Dr. Clark as set forth in
that meeting, and with which this complaint is concerned, are in
error and in conflict with the constitutional requirements for
licensure and ordination, and that, therefore, the decision to
sustain his theological examination, the decision to waive two
years of study in a theological seminary, the decision to
proceed to license Dr. Clark and the action of licensing him,
the decision to deem the examination for licensure
sufficient for ordination, and the decision to ordain
Dr. Clark, were in error and unconstitutional, and are,
therefore, null and void.
(Signed)
JOHN WISTAR BETZOID
EUGENE BRADFORD
R. B. KUIPER
LEROY B. OLIVER
N. B. STONEHOUSE
MURRAY FORST THOMPSON
WILLIAM E. WELMERS
PAUL WOOLLEY
CORNELIUS VAN TIL
EDWARD J. YOUNG
DAVID FREEMAN
ARTHUR W. KUSCHKE, JR.
The
undersigned hereby subscribes to the complaint against certain
actions of the Presbyery of Philadelphia taken at its
meeting on July 7th, 1944, to the extent of
concurring in the statement of the reasons for the complaint as
set forth herein: LESLIE W. SLOAT.
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1 comment:
Any errors found please let me know. I have already corrected one error found by someone who proofed The Complaint.
The error was corrected as follows:
"The divine knowledge as human, even when that human knowledge is a knowledge communicated by God.”
The sentence should read:
“The divine knowledge as divine, transcends human knowledge as human, even when that human knowledge is a knowledge communicated by God.”
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