[As there may be typographical and/or transcription errors, please refer to the pdf version for verification at The Answer. If anyone finds errors please leave a comment so these errors can be fixed. Charlie J. Ray. See also: The Complaint.]
The Answer
To a Complaint Against
Several Actions and Decisions of the Presbytery of
Philadelphia Taken in a Special Meeting Held on July 7, 1944
Proposed to the Presbytery of
Philadelphia of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church by the
Committee Elected by Presbytery to Prepare Such an
Answer.
ALAN TICHENOR, Chairman.
ROBERT STRONG, Secretary.
FLOYD E. HAMILTON.
EDWIN H. RIAN.
GORDON H. CLARK.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Legal Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
On Incomprehensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
On Intellect, Will, and Emotions . . . . . . .26
On Sovereignty and Responsibility . . . . 35
On the Offer of the Gospel . . . . . . . . . . . 38
The transcript of the
theological examination of July 7, 1944, is extremely
inaccurate. Many of the words do not make good sense because of
errors in reporting. It is quoted, however, without any
attempt to correct the language. The references in this Answer
are made in the following style: (P. 10, 2; O. 40) indicates the
Complaint, Printed Copy, page 10, column 2; Original page 40.
The transcript of the theological examination of July 7,
1944 is cited by page and line.
The Legal Question
The Presbytery of Philadelphia
hereby replies to the Complaint of Mr. John W. Betzold
et. al. against certain actions of the Presbytery in
connection with its decisions to license and ordain Gordon H.
Clark, Ph.D.
The Presbytery denies that the
special meeting held on July 7, 1944, was illegal. The
Complaint alleges that the meeting was illegal, on the
ground that no emergency existed that justified the calling of
the meeting. The Complaint seems to hold that even if a
situation had prevailed which Presbytery would
ordinarily regard as an emergency, yet even then the
meeting would be illegal, since the particular business for
which the meeting was called was not proper business to
be conducted at a special meeting.
The special meeting in question
was called in accordance with Form of Government,
Chapter X, section 9. The Presbytery holds that there
was an emergency which justified the calling of the meeting and
that the calling of the meeting accords with accepted
Presbyterian practice of many years' standing. The uniform
practice of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. And of The
Orthdox Presbyterian Church in this matter indicates the
meaning which has consistently been placed upon this
section of the Form of Government. A perusal of the
minutes of any number of presbyteries of the Presbyterian Church
in the U.S.A. will indicate that for many years special
meetings have been called when a sufficient number of presbyters
felt that the convenience of the Presbytery or of some persons
involved in the business created an emergency. This has
been the consistent practice of the Presbytery of Philadelphia.
Of the special meetings of the Presbytery recorded in
the Minutes probably one was called in an emergency that
conformed to the Complaint's definition of the word—i.e.,
“important occurrences unknown at their last meeting and which
cannot be safely deferred till their stated meeting, such
as a scandal raised on a minister's character tending to destroy
his usefulness, and bring reproach on religion; or feuds in a
congregation threatening its dissolution; or some dangerous
error, or heresy broached . . .” (P. 1, 3; O. 4). All the
special meetings held by this Presbytery have been held in
accordance with recognized Presbyterian practice—i.e.,
they have been called when the postponement of the business
until the regular meeting would seriously inconvenience a
candidate, a minister, a church, or the Presbytery. The
complainants have all previously taken part in such
meetings without complaint.
To refer to one of several
instances that could be cited, on July 8, 1941, a
special meeting was held to ordain Licentiate Eugene D.
Bradford. The Minutes of Presbytery do not record what the
emergency was that prompted the call for this meeting, but it is
within the recollection of presbyters that Mr. Bradford
had received and accepted a call to an independent church and
that he and the church would have been seriously
inconvenienced if his ordination had been delayed until
the regular meeting of the Presbytery. The moderators
and a sufficient number of other presbyters had judged that this
was an emergency in accordance with the terms of Form of
Government, Chapter X, section 9, and the Presbytery concurred
in this judgment by proceeding with the business for
which the meeting was called. There is no indication in the
record that the actions of this meeting were not
unanimous. Of the seven ministers present at that meeting,
four are now among the complainants!
A postponement of the
examination of Dr. Clark would have seriously
inconvenienced him. For well over a year the matter of his
ordination had been before the Presbytery. Dr. Clark had made
two trips from Wheaton, Ill., to Philadelphia to appear before
the Presbytery or before its committee on candidates. He had
traveled at his own expense about 3,000 miles for these
appearances. He had had to postpone planning his future
until the matter of his ordination was settled. Further
delay in planning his future would seriously have
affected his usefulness in Christian service. At the time of
the special meeting Dr. Clark was in the East on other business.
He did not plan to be East at the time of the regular
meeting, and could not have made a special trip at that
time. Courtesy to Dr. Clark and consideration for him
dictated the call of a special meeting at a time
convenient for him. Those who were responsible for calling the
meeting were careful to set a day when no impediment seemed to
obtain to prevent the attendance of any member who could
attend the regular meeting. That the date set was a most
convenient one for the Presbytery is evidenced by the fact that
the meeting was the most largely attended one in the
history of the Presbytery.
The Presbytery would point out
that a judicatory has a simple and most effective way of
dealing with meetings for the calling of which it
thinks there has been insufficient warrant. It can simply refuse
to do the business for which it is called. This the Presbytery
did not do on July 7, 1944, but proceeded with its
business, in accordance with the terms of the call of
the meeting. There is no provision in the Form of
Government of The Orthodox Presbyterian Chruch that a
special meeting can be held only pro re nata. As a matter
of fact, this term is not used in our Form of Government, nor
in the Form of Government of the Presbyterian Church in
the U.S.A., upon which our Form of Government was based.
To be sure, as the Complaint indicates, the Synod of
1760 judged that meetings pro re nata can be
held only “on account of important occurrences unknown at their
last meeting, and which cannot be safely deferred till their
stated meeting” (P. 1, 3; O. 4). Yet the Synod of 1788 when it
came time to adopt a Form of Government, which made provision
for special meetings, did not provide for special meetings to
be held only under these restricted terms. It is
significant that this Synod, although it had the precedent set
by the decision of the Synod of 1760 before it, did not
denominate special meetings pro re nata. This
expression has never occurred in the Form of
Government of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.
from the first edition, published in 1789, to the present
date. There is no evidence that the Synod of 1788 in its Form
of Government ever intended to restrict special meetings
so drastically as the Synod of 1760 had indicated,
and the Complaint certainly offers no evidence that
the Form of Government of The Orthodox Presbyterian Church
intended thus to restrict special meetings so
drastically as the Synod of 1760 had indicated, and the
Complaint certainly offers no evidence that the Form of
Government of The Orthodox Presbyterian Church
intended thus to restrict them. No presbytery of the
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. Is known in
practice, to have so restricted the calling of special
meetings, and certainly the Presbytery of Philadelphia of The
Orthodox Presbyterian Church has never so restricted
them. The Form of Government does not concern
itself with the question whether the business to be done has
newly arisen since the last regular meeting of the presbytery,
but simply with the question whether an emergency
exists important enough in the judgment of the
moderator and of sufficient other presbyters, to
warrant the calling of a special meeting.
The
Presbytery thus maintains that the meeting of July 7, 1944,
was legal in every respect, and it denies the plea of
the complainants that this meeting “be found to have
been illegally convened and that its acts and
decisions and the acts and decisions issuing therefrom be
declared null and void” (P. 2, 3; O. 7-8).
On Incomprehensibility
In turning from the legal aspect
of the Complaint to the theological aspects, the
Presbytery wishes first of all to underscore the tenuous
subtlety of the questions involved. Note well that Dr. Clark
without equivocation subscribed to the Westminster Confession of
Faith. The second examination concerned itself largely
with the philosophical implications of certain phrases
in the Confession and the particular interpretations
which the questioners, now the complainants, placed upon
them. This fact must be made clear to everyone who desires to
see this Complaint in its true light. Dr. Clark accepts the
Westminster Confession of Faith. The complainants found no
objection to Dr. Clark's doctrinal views under the heading of
the verbal and plenary inspiration of Scripture, the
creation, providence and miracles, or the fall of man. The
complainants have not attempted to attack Dr. Clark's
doctrine of the atonement, effectual calling, justification by
faith, sanctification, or eschatology. It is therefore not
surprising that at the most largely attended meeting of
the Presbytery of Philadelphia in history Dr. Clark's
examination in theology was sustained by more than a
three-fourths vote of the Presbytery. Even some of the
complainants themselves at that meeting of Presbytery
voted to sustain the examination in theology. More than
three-fourths of the Presbytery of Philadelphia were satisfied
of Dr. Clark's adherence to the Westminster Confession of Faith.
And now a Complaint against the
Presbytery is signed by thirteen persons alleging errors
in Dr. Clark's views regarding (1) the incomprehensibility of
God and the relationship of God's knowledge to man's
knowledge; (2) the relationships among the intellect, will, and
emotions; (3) the relationship between divine sovereignty and
human responsibility; (4) the offer of the gospel to man.
Underlying all the charges is an assumption that Dr.
Clark's thinking “bears all the earmarks of rationalism,
humanistic intellectualism” and “vicious independence from God”
(P. 10, 2; O. 40).
The first section of the
Complaint is concerned with the doctrine of the
incomprehensibility of God. Before analyzing this section step
by step the Presbytery thinks it best to make some general
observations on the doctrine in question. The Complaint, as
will be seen, charges “that Dr. Clark's view of the
incomprehensibility of God is definitely at variance with the
meaning that this doctrine has had in Christian
theology” (P. 5, 1; O. 18). This charge assumes that throughout
Christian theology this doctrine has had but one definite
meaning, for the Complaint (P. 4, 2; O. 15) also refers to “its
uniform significance in the history of Christian thought”; the
charge assumes that the complainants' theory is that one
definite meaning; and that Dr. Clark in disagreeing with them
rejects this uniform element in Christian theology.
These assumptions, however, are false. The
incomprehensibility of God, as explained by Dionysus the
Areopagite, is quite different from the doctrine as explained
by Charles Hodge. A comparison between two other theologians
might show other differences, even though less violent.
The assumption that it is possible to determine “the
meaning that this doctrine has had in Christian
theology” is therefore a false assumption. Furthermore,
several of the particular points at issue in this Complaint have
received far from exhaustive treatment in the history of
theology. The Presbytery cannot assert that no book or
manuscript has ever discussed these points, but it can assert
that there is no well defined position recognized by any large
number of theologians.
The view of the Complaint is that “God because of his very nature
must remain incomprehensible to man” (P. 2, 3: O. 8); it is
“not the doctrine that God can be known only if he
makes himself known and in so far as he makes
himself known” (ibid.).
Moreover all knowledge which man can attain differs from the
knowledge of God “in a qualitative sense and not merely in
degree” (P. 4, 2; O. 15). Thus God's knowledge and man's
knowledge do not “coincide at any single point” (P. 5, 3; O.
21). A proposition does not “have the same meaning for man as
for God” (P. 5, 2; O. 20). Man's knowledge is
“analogical to the knowledge God possesses, but it can never
be identified with the knowledge” which God
“possesses of the same proposition” (P. 5, 3; O. 21). “The
divine knowledge as divine
transcends human knowledge as human, even when that human
knowledge is a knowledge communicated by God” (P. 3, 1;
O. 9). “Because of
his very nature as infinite and absolute the knowledge which
God posseses of himself and of all things must remain a mystery which
the finite mind of man cannot penetrate” (ibid.).
This latter statement does not mean merely that man cannot
penetrate this mystery unaided by revelation; it means that
even revelation by God could not make man understand
the mystery, for the preceding sentences assert
that it is the nature of God that renders him
incomprehensible, not the lack of a revelation about it. As
the analysis proceeds, these quotations with the argument from
which they are taken will be seen to imply two
chief points. First, there is some truth that God
cannot put into propositional form; this portion of
truth cannot be expressed conceptually. Second, the portion of
truth that God can express in propositional form never has
the same meaning for man as it has for God. Every
proposition that man knows has a qualitatively
different meaning for God. Man can grasp only an
analogy of the truth, which, because it is an analogy, is not
the truth itself.
On
the other hand Dr. Clark contends that the doctrine of the
incomprehensibility of God as set forth in Scripture and in the
Confession of Faith includes the following points: 1. The
essence of God's being is incomprehensible to man except as
God reveals truths concerning his own nature; 2. The
manner of God's knowing an eternal intuition, is
impossible for man; 3. Man can never know exhaustively
and completely God's knowledge of any truth in all its
relationships and implications; because every truth has an
infinite number of relationships and implications
and since each of these implications in turn has
other infinite implications, these must ever, even
in heaven, remain inexhaustible for man; 4. But, Dr.
Clark maintains, the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of
God does not mean that a proposition, e. g.,
two times two are four, has one meaning for man and a
qualitatively different meaning for God, or that some truth
is conceptual and other truth is non-conceptual in
nature.
Here
is the crux of the issue. By insisting that God's knowledge is
qualitatively different from that of man and that “his
knowledge and our knowledge” do not “coincide at any single
point,” the Complaint is advancing a theory of a two-fold
truth; while Dr. Clark holds that the nature of
truth is one, that if man knows any item of truth,
both God and man know that same identical item, and that on
this item God's knowledge and man's knowledge coincide.
According to the Complaint man can never know even one item
of truth God knows; man can know only an
“analogical” truth, and this analogical truth is not the same
truth that God knows, for the truth that God knows
is “qualitatively” different, and God cannot reveal it to
man because man is a creature. To repeat: the truth that God
knows and the truth that man knows are never the same
truth, for they do not “coincide at any single
point.” God's knowledge therefore would be incomprehensible to
man for the specific reason that God could not
reveal any particular fact about it without destroying the
“Creator-creature relationship.” Dr. Clark holds that God can
reveal any item of knowledge in propositional form without
destroying the Creator-creature relationship, and that
such a revealed proposition has the same meaning for God and
for man when, as is sometimes the case, man
understands it. Now, what is the meaning of the
doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God taught in Scripture
and the Confession of Faith? Though the Complaint asserts
that its “doctrine of incomprehensibility is the
teaching of Scripture” and that it is “taught in many passages
and is implicit in the doctrine of the divine transcendence
which is everywhere taught or presupposed in
Scripture,” it cites only a few passages, doubtless
chosen because they are thought to present the strongest
Scriptural proof of the doctrine. The first of these passages
is Psalm 145:3, “His greatness is unsearchable.” The second passage cited is Isaiah 40:28, “There is no searching of his understanding.” And the third is from an uninspired speaker in Job 11:7, 8,
“Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou
find out the Almighty to perfection? It is as high as heaven:
what canst thou do? Deeper than Sheol; what canst
thou know?” The Hebrew root for search in these three passages is chaqar, which means to search or to examine.
The passages all teach that man by his own unaided
efforts cannot search out God's greatness or
understanding. They do not teach that God cannot
reveal any particular proposition about his greatness, for
they are in fact themselves propositions about the greatness
and understanding of God. How much God will reveal to
man is quite another question; but these verses do not imply
that there is a phase of God's knowledge that God
cannot reveal, if he chooses to do so. And they certainly do
not imply that some truth is non-conceptual in
nature. Just what sort of truth would non-conceptual truth be?
1 Timothy 6:16,
“dwelling in light unapproachable, whom no man hath
seen or can see,” is quoted as proving that “man the creature
may never trespass or even draw near to contemplate God as he
is in himself” (P. 4, 3; O. 17). But this is not
what the verse says. The verse does not say that man cannot
contemplate or think about God; it says that man
cannot see him. Theophilus, quoted by Meyer, in loc.,
understands the verb to see literally, and makes
the verse mean that God is an invisible spirit. It
is the mystic Dionysius who takes the verb to see in
the intellectual sense of to contemplate,
and makes the verse mean that God is unthinkable. That this
mystical interpretation of negative theology is
wrong, and that the verb to see in this particular verse must be understood literally, is substantiated by Job 19:26, 27,
“yet in my flesh (or, without my flesh) shall I see God; whom
I shall see for myself.” Superficially, Job seems
to contradict Paul. The Hebrew verb in Job, chazah, often means to contemplate.
It must mean contemplation here, for the literal meaning of
physical sight would make the verse inconsistent with the
Scriptural teaching of the spirituality of God. The
literal meaning in Job would make the verse untrue.
Hence Job definitely asserts that man will contemplate God.
Since 1 Timothy 6:16
cannot contradict the teaching of Job, it must
refer to literal sight, not to contemplation, and
therefore the exegesis of the Complaint is thus shown to be
mistaken. The spirituality and the invisibility of God, not
his unthinkability, is also taught in John 1:18 and John 6:46,
and to this teaching the former of these verses
expressly adds the fact of revelation. Therefore
these verses should not have been cited to prove
that God has knowledge which he cannot reveal to man.
Deuteronomy 29:29,
“The secret things belong unto Jehovah God; but the thinks
that are revealed belong unto us and to our children forever,”
also supports Dr. Clark's view of the knowledge of
God. Man cannot of himself discover God's secrets;
he can know only what God reveals to him; but when
truths are revealed, they are revealed to be understood, for
they “belong unto us and to our children forever.” Further, no
one has a right to set a limit on the power of God to
reveal in heaven any item which is now among the secret
things. Until it is revealed, man cannot discover it; it is
indeed incomprehensible because it is unrevealed.
Two other passages cited likewise agree with Dr. Clark's view: Matthew 11:27 (and Luke 10:22),
“Neither doth any know the Father, save the Son,
and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him.” Only the
Son has that original and underived knowledge of the Father,
which can initiate a revelation. Man cannot know God
unless the Son “willeth to reveal him.” But when the Son
reveals God, man can know him truly insofar as he is revealed,
and that knowledge is true knowledge, true both for
God and for man.
Romans 11:33,
cited in the Complaint but not quoted, also teaches the same
Scriptural doctrine that Dr. Clark accepts. None of these
verses gives a hint of the Complaint's strange teaching
that there is a part of God's knowledge which he
cannot reveal to man, did he choose to do so,
without destroying the distinction between the Creator and the
creature. It is pertinent to ask just how the distinction
between the Creator and the creature would be
destroyed, if God made man understand some given
item of knowledge so that God's knowledge and man's
knowledge coincided at the point revealed by God to man. Of
course God's knowledge of the subject would not be exhausted
by what he revealed to man, but insofar as man
understood the one revealed truth, his knowledge
would coincide with that part of God's knowledge
that God has chosen to reveal. The given proposition would be
true both for God and for man; but what God does not reveal
remains incomprehensible.
In
conclusion the Presbytery believes that this section of the
Complaint utterly fails to prove that Dr. Clark is out of
accord with the system of doctrine of the
Confession; They are not strictly theological doctrines at
all, but tenuous implications from these doctrines;
and the implications are fallacious. Therefore this section of
the Complaint fails to show that the Philadelphia Presbytery
was in error in licensing and ordaining Dr. Clark.
The most plausible passage that the complainants cite in support of their position is Isaiah 55:8, 9.
If their doctrine is not found here, it is difficult to
see where in Scripture it may be found. The passage is:
“For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways
my ways, saith Jehovah. For as the heavens are higher than the
earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts
than your thoughts.” At first glance this passage may seem
favorable to the position of the complainants. It seems
to teach that we cannot think God's thoughts—we cannot
even think God's thoughts after him. But since, as has been
seen, this idea is not supported by the other passages
cited, one should be wary of jumping to the conclusion that
it is inescapably taught here. The context of these verses aids
in understanding the prophet's meaning. In a wonderful
passage commanding the wicked to return unto the Lord, the
promise is held out that God will abundantly pardon,
“for my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are you
ways my ways.” The point is that man would say that the wicked
should never be pardoned, or could never be pardoned.
That is the way a man would think. God, however, thinks
differently. He knows something that man does not know. God
knows that he will send his Son to bear the penalty of sin, so
that justice and mercy may meet. Thus God's ways and
thoughts with reference to salvation were as different
from man's as heaven is high above the earth. The
significance of the verses therefore lies in a comparison
between human thoughts about salvation and God's thoughts about
it. God had plans about sending a substitutionary Saviour, which
were not revealed to man, and those plans were so wonderful
that there was no comparison with earthly standards. Of
course there are two levels indicated in this passage:
on the divine level there is rational knowledge, while on the
human level are ignorance and false ideas. There are two levels,
to be sure, but not two levels of knowledge. One should
therefore hesitate to claim that this passage teaches that
the “gulf which separates divine knowledge from human knowledge”
is unbridgable by God if he chooses to bridge it, for in the
case in question as a matter of fact he did bridgge it in
sending the Saviour. Now we can see and understand partially, at
least, but nevertheless truly, the reason by God could pardon
repentant sinners in the Old Testament dispensation. We
conclude therefore that even this most plausible passage
cited does not really support the complainants' position
regarding the incomprehensibility of God.
Brief reference should be made
to certain passages which among many others more
pointedly support Dr. Clark's contention that God is truly
knowable insofar as he reveals himself to man. John 17:3
says, “This life is eternal that should know thee the
only true God, and him whom thou didst send, even Jesus
Christ.” Knowing God is said to be the essence of
eternal life. No limits are placed on the amount of knowledge
man may have about God. Other verses teach that man can
know only what the Son reveals, but the assumption is clear that
the Son can reveal to his people whatever he chooses. And it is
assumed that such knowledge is true and valid for both
God and man. Doubtless it would be only such knowledge as a
creature could comprehend, but no limit is set for the
comprehension of revealed truth. The manner of God's
knowing would of course be different, and would
eternallly remain incomprehensible to man, but there is no
evidence that there are any items of knowledge about God which
God could not reveal to us, did he choose to do so.
The second passage is John 7:17:
“If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know of
the teaching whether it is of God.” Here we have described
the true way to true knowledge of God-revealed doctrine. Willing
to do God's will is the way of knowledge of God's
revelation. Certainly knowledge of God-revealed truth is
here set as a goal before the man who wills to do God's
will. Man may never reach the goal of perfect knowledge
of revealed truth, but no barrier of mystery is here “set
forth in divine revelation that” is “quite beyond the powers of
the finite mind to comprehend.” On the contrary it is implied
that there are no such barriers in revealed truth for the one
who wills to do God's will.
The third passage is: “Whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning” (Romans 15:4; cf. 1 Corinthians 10:11).
Insofar as God has revealed truth to man he clearly
intends man to strive to understand God's meaning. The
Presbytery finds nothing in Scripture implying that God places
a different meaning on a proposition from that which he
intends man to understand. When Scripture says, “Ye
shall know the truth” (John 8:32),
certainly the assumption is that it it the same truth for
both God and man. When Christ told the disiciples “Howbeit
when he, the Spirit of truth is come, he will guide
you into all truth” (John 16:13),
he certainly implied that under the Holy Spirit's guidance
man can investigate all revealed truth, and the assumption
seems to be that the Holy Spirit could, if he chose,
reveal any particular truth to man. That is not to
claim that man can sometime in eternity become
omniscient by the comprehension of one truth after another as
God reveals them to him. Man's knowledge would always be
temporar, and could never include either the immediate,
intuitive knowledge of God, or the knowledge of all
the relationships and implications of any and all
propositions. The necessary content of omnisicence includes
knowledge of what is to man the infinite future, the past in
all its content, and all the infinite relationships and
implications of all items of knowledge, past, present and
future, as well as the infinite self-consciousness
of God, both of his own Triune nature and of the
manner in which he knows the universe, including the knowledge
that God has of what is possible for him to do but which he
will never do. Man can never become omniscient by
adding one item of knowledge to another throughout
eternity.
Several other passages of Scripture set forth Dr. Clark's view of the matter. Psalm 36:9,
“In thy light shall we see light,” does not say that
we shall see merely some analogical reflection of the light. A
similar meaning is embedded in Psalm 43:3, “Send out thy light and thy truth, let them lead me.” Particularly significant is 1 Corinthians 13:12,
“Now I know in part, but then shall I know even as I
am known,” for no limit is placed on the knowledge redeemed
men man acquire in heaven. If the redeemed are to know as God
knows them, it would seem that God will reveal a much
greater amount of knowledge in the future life than
we now expect. Furthermore this verse implies that
though our present knowledge is partial, it is
nevertheless true knowledge of the same meaning that God has.
This
is far from the so-called quantitative view of truth which the
complainants charge would destroy the gulf separating divine
knowledge and human knowledge, and so break down the
distinction between the Creator and the creature. They have
failed in their theory to grasp the correct meaning
of omniscience, and they also fail to see the
significance of the Scriptural injunction to “grow
in knowledge” (2 Peter 3:18).
Where in Scripture is there evidence that a truth
or a proposition is qualitatively different for God and
man? Where can one find the idea in Scripture that God's
knowledge and man's knowledge do not coincide at any single
point?
Even
on the complainants' charge, that “Dr. Clark denies that there
is any qualitative distinction between the contents
of the knowledge of God and the contents of the
knowledge possible to man, but rather in so far as
there is any distinction between these two the distinction
is merely quantitative” (P. 5, 1; O. 19), it does not follow
that the distinction between the creature and the
Creator is broken down thereby, or that there is “an
assault upon the majesty of God” (P. 3, 1; O. 9). When the
meaning of omniscience is understood as above, man's
increase by revelation in knowledge on the temporal
plane would, throughtout eternity, still fall infinitely short
of omniscience. As a matter of fact, however, as will be
seen later, Dr. Clark does not deny the qualitative
distinction between God's knowledge and man's.
In
the Confession of Faith there is even less support for the
strange doctrine that there are mysterious areas of
knowledge which God has, incapable of being revealed
by God to man or of being understood by man even if
God revealed them. In the Confession, II, 1, and the Larger Catechism,
question 7, the word “incomprehensible” occurs as
one of the attibutes of God. No theory of incomprehensibility
is taught, and no explanation is given of the sense in which
the term is used, though a hint is perhaps given as
to the meaning by the choice of the proof text
selected. The chosen text is Psalm 145:3,
“His greatness is unsearchable.” As already shown,
this supports the view of Dr. Clark, that man cannot
by his own efforts search out or discover knowledge
about the greatness of God. Dr. Clark stands by the
doctrine taught in the Confession.
The
Presbytery concludes, therefore, that neither in Scripture nor
in the Confession is there any evidence that God, if
he chooses, cannot reveal any item of knowledge to
man; nor would man cease to be a creature by
understanding or seeking to understand such a revelation;
nor is there any evidence that a proposition is qualitatively
different for God and man; nor that God's knowledge and man's
knowledge do not coincide at any single point.
Having
contrasted the basic contention of the Complainant regarding
the knowledge of God and his incomprehensibility
with the position taken by Dr. Clark on these
points, and having shown that both Scripture and the
Confession of Faith support Dr. Clark's position rather than
that of the Complainant, it is necessary to proceed to an
analysis of the Complainant itself.
The
first of three numbered steps asserts that “the fundamental
assumption made by Dr. Clark is that truth, whether in the
divine mind or in the human mind, is always propositional.”
The Presbytery replies to this assertion by pointing out that
there is nothing in the transcript to justify it.
The transcript is very imperfect and at times
unintelligible, but the passages cited in the
Complaint have nothing to do with truth as it is in the divine
mind. The three passages cited speak only of truth as it is in
the human mind, and therefore the Complainant misrepresents
Dr. Clark. Dr. Clark has said that all truth can be
expressed in propositions, but this does not mean
that God thinks in propositions. The complainants in
order to be fair should have noted that in the transcript
(26, 1-9 and 27, 24-28, 22) Dr. Clark denies what they assert
in the Complaint.
The first of these passages reads: “Q. Dr. Clark, you have said that man's knowledge is of a series of propositions, that is, discursively. A. Yes. Q. That God's knowledge is intuitive. A. Yes. Q. Do you mean by that, that God sees everything in all its infinite relation, all at one glance?” A.Yes,
that is awkward language but I don't know any better, if you
don't press me too hard on it.” The second passage
contains these words: “Q. Do you believe that God's intuitive knowledge is the same as our discursive knowledge? A.
Well, I guess not, two times two is four, both for
God and for us, that is the expression of God's
knowledge and if we don't know the object that God
knows, then we are in absolute ignorance. Q. Would
you mind repeating your statement or Mr. Andrews'
statement, what was it? MR. ANDREWS: As I recall it,
it was: 'God's knowledge is intuitive and He sees and
knows everything in all of its infinite relations at one
glance.'” These two passages of the transcript, though brief,
incomplete, and defective, show clearly that Dr. Clark does
not hold God's knowledge to be propositional. The
complainants in their charge above have ignored the
record.
With
this first point based on a false statement, the remainder of
step one loses all compulsion. For example, the
complainants say (P. 5, 2; O. 19), “This view of
truth, it will be noted, conceives of truth as fundamentally
quantitative . . .” Even in the case of man, who can think
only discursively, this conclusion does not follow. From the
fact that each proposition may be numbered the
complainants have inferred that truth is numerical or
quantitative. This is extremely bad logic. The fallacy
consists in stressing a fact of minor importance as as to give
the impression that no other factor is involved. It
is true that men know several propositions and each
proposition is distinct. A mind that knows nine propositions
may be said to know more than a mind that knows six. But how
insignificant the mere quantity is may be grasped if we
consider that one mind may know six integrated propositions,
while the other mind has nine pieces of disconnected
information. Not only may the information two minds
have be distinguished by the degree of logical
connection among its parts, but also there is a difference in
the relative importance of the judgments. For example, two
minds may both know six propositions, but one mind
knows six general rules while the other has six
particular facts. The number of propositions, the quantity as
the Complaint calls it, is the same in both
instances, but the former is the better mind. The complainants
therefore have no evidence that Dr. Clark holds truth to be
fundamentally quantitative.
Hence
the complainants have failed to understand Dr. Clark and have
seriously distorted and misrepresented his views. They imply
(P. 5, 2; O. 20) that Dr. Clark considers that
“knowledge is a matter of propositions divorced from
the knowing subject, that is, of self-contained, independent
statements.” This is entirely gratuitous, for there is no
evidence whatsoever to support it. Dr. Clark rejects
the idea that truth is independent of God. The complainants
(P. 6, 2; O. 22) also say “the approach of Dr. Clark
is quantitative through and through.” They are also wrong (P.
5, 3; O. 21) where they say he resolves “knowledge into
detached items.” It is therefore by a disregard both of logic
and of the evidence that the Complaint can conclude
that (P. 5, 2; O. 19) “This view of truth, it will
be noted conceives of truth as fundamentally
quantitative.” As has been shown, the Complaint is at least
inaccurate where (P. 5, 1; O. 19) it says that Dr. Clark holds
that the distinction between God's knowledge and man's is
“merely quantitative.”
The method the complainants have
pursued is to center attention on one accident of a
proposition and then tenacity to assume that there is nothing more
to be said. Because each proposition is numerically distinct,
they infer that there is nothing except numerical distinction.
Later in the Complaint
they offer a reason for their concern over what may seem
arid logical technicalities. They assert (P. 7, 3; O. 28) “This
knowing of propositions cannot, in the nature of the case,
reflect or inspire any recognition by man of his relation to
God, for the simple reason that the propositions have
the same content, mean the same, to God and man.” If
this pronouncement be applied to a concrete case, it
means that the truth “Christ died for our sins” cannot reflect
or inspire recognition of man's relation to God. Why
propositions, such as “Christ died for our sins” cannot reflect
the truth of God, the complainants do not explain. They simply
make an ex cathedra statement. One may ask, of what use are all
the propositions of Scripture, if they do not reflect God and
his relation to man? And if propositions cannot inspire any
recognition by man of his relation to God, why should anyone
preach the gospel? Dr. Clark believes that the preaching of the
gospel, not without the regenerating or illuminating
power of the Holy Ghost, is for the express purpose of teaching
man what to believe concerning God and what duty God
requires of man. Since Scripture is in propositional
form, the assumption of the Complaint that no statement in the
Bible can reflect or inspire any recognition by man of his
relation to God is both absurd and unscriptural. The
second part of the same sentence purports to give a reason for
the first part: propositions cannot inspire recognition
of God, “for the simple reason that propositions have the same
content, mean the same, to God and man.” The complainants
therefore deny that propositions have the same meaning
for God and man. But this denial nullifies the Bible from
cover to cover. The same idea is found in another place. The
Complainant infers as an untenable conclusion from Dr. Clark's
views that therefore (P. 5, 2; O. 20) “a proposition would have
to have the same meaning for man as for God.” Here is
the basic difference in this matter for Dr. Clark and
the Complainant. He holds that propositions have a single
meaning, the same for God and man. The Complainant
evidently assumes that a given proposition has two entirely
different meanings. One of these meanings man can grasp;
the other meaning God alone knows and man has no idea at all of
what God means. But if this were so, what would become of the
doctrine of verbal inspiration? The proposition, Christ
died for our sins, has a single, definite, plain
meaning. To say that God places some other,
undiscoverable meaning upon these words is to empty the Bible of
truth and to deny that really reveals God's mind. This logical
deduction from the Complaint is to be repudiated.
Involved in the
discussion of these same pages of the Complaint is the role of
reason in religious knowledge. “It will be observed that Dr.
Clark does not claim to derive this judgment from Scripture;
it is rather regarded as an axiom of reason” (P. 5, 2;
O. 19). The complainants also say (P. 5, 2; 9. 20) “and it may
not be overlooked in this connection that Dr. Clark does not
claim Scriptural proof for his fundamental assumption as to the
character of knowledge.” One might guess that the
complainants would demand exegetical proof even for the
theorems of geometry. Later they say (P. 6, 3; O. 24,
25) “And that he is in error seems to be due to the fact that he
does not approach the doctrine by way of an exegesis of
Scripture. His approach, on the contrary, while admittedly
taking into account certain teachings of Scripture, is to a
large extent rationalistic. His argument is built up
from certain principles derived from reason. One cannot expect a
sound theology to proceed from a faulty method. In
short, therefore, we hold that both the formulation of this
doctrine and the method by which it is reached are out
of harmony with orthodox Presbyterianism.”
It has already been shown that
Dr. Clark's position agrees with Scripture, but the
implication of this charge seems to be that an appeal to
principles of reason is out of harmony with orthodox
Presbyterianism. Now in the first place, some of this discussion
is not so far removed from Scripture as the complainants seem
to think. It is true that the assertion “truth may
always be expressed in propositions” is not a conclusion
based on the exegesis of a certain number of Scriptural
passages. The doctrine of the federal headship of Adam
may be deduced by exegesis from Romans 5:12ff.;
and the unity of the covenant of grace is supported by
Galatians 3. There is no single passage from which by
exegesis one can deduce that truth may always be
expressed in propositions. But it must be insisted upon that the
Bible as a whole is written in propositional form. The
propositions of the Bible are not propositions about
propositions; that is, the Bible is not a textbook on
logic. But the Bible is logical; its teaching is propositional;
and in view of the fact that God chose words and
propositions for his revelation, in view of the fact that
God did not choose some non-propositional form of revelation,
one should be cautious of disparaging propositions. There is
therefore Scriptural support, even if not exegetical
support, for the propositional view of truth.
In the second place, and now
directly to the point, an appeal to principles of reason
is not out of harmony with orthdox Presbyterianism. We trust it
will be granted that William Brenton Greene, late professor
of apologetics in Princeton Seminary, was an orthodox
Presbyterian. The following quotation from The Function of
Reason in Christianity, by W. Brenton Greene, Jr., in The
Presbyterian and Reformed Review, Vol. VI, 1895, pages
499ff., illustrates a view that has had wide acceptance.
For all that logically precedes
the Scriptures, as the being of God, the need of a
written revelation, etc., we must go back to philosophy, to
reason pure and simple . . . . Hence Henry B. Smith has well
said: “If we cannot construct the foundations and the outworks
of the Christian System on impregnable grounds; if we cannot
show the possibility of miracles, and of a revelation; if we
cannot prove—absolutely prove—the existence of a wise,
intelligent, personal, and providential Ruler of all things:
then we are merged in infidelity, or given over to an
unfounded faith. If we cannot settle these points on the field
of open discussion, we cannot settle them at all.” . . .
Reason should distinguish among the interpretations of the
Scriptures between what is above reason in the true
sense of beyond it, and what is above reason in the wrong sense
of out of relation to it, or contrary to it. That is, as a
revelation must evince rationally its right to be believed; so,
as has been seen, it itself can contain nothing irrational or
impossible. In deciding what is thus, however, the reason must
act rationally and not capriciously. Its judgments must
be guided by principles which commend themselves to the common
consciousness of men, such as, that that is impossible
which involves a contradiction; that it is impossible that
revelation should deny any well authenticated truth,
whether of intuition, experience, or science; that it is impossible for what reason cannot try to comprehend to be true.
All this must be so; for God, who is the Supreme
Reason, cannot but be rational and hence
self-consistent.”
The
italicized phrase is a little awkward in expression, but its
implications for the doctrine of incomprehensibility are
tremendous.
This quotation from W. Brenton
Greene, Jr., particularly his approval of the two
sentences from Henry B. Smith, may seem rationalistic to those
who have not been raised in the Presbyterian tradition. The
Presbytery does not insist that Greene's position must be
accepted. The point is that here is a man whom all ought to
recognize as orthodox; he was not only a Presbyterian minister,
he was the professor of apologetics in what was at that time the
citadel of Presbyterian orthodoxy. And this professor of
apologetics gives a wider scope to reason that does Dr.
Clark. If, as the Complaint argues, “One cannot expect a sound
theology to proceed from a faulty method,” if, that is, a faulty
method vitiates a man's doctrine of the atonement and all other
doctrines, then according to the argument of the
Complaint Greene's theological views must have been
thoroughly heretical because his method is even more
“rationalistic” than that alleged of Dr. Clark. If the Orthodox
Presbyterian Church is ready to require subscription to a
particular apologetic, let this change come by an open attempt
to amend the Confession of Faith and not by the indirect method
of a Complaint against a particular action of one
Presbytery.
A. A. Hodge, also, in his
Outlines of Theology appeals to reason. On page 19, 8,
2d, he refers to “the light of nature.” Just below he speaks of
“the demonstration of the a-priori possibility of a supernatural
revelation.” On page 37 he answers Hume by an appeal to
“a universal and necessary judgment of reason.” On page 45 he
says, “It is certain that the intuitions of necessary truth are
the same in all men. They are not generalizations from
experience, but are presupposed in all experience.” See
in particular his defense of natural theology on page
53, 1, 1st, page 54, 2, 2d; also page 61, 10. On page 62, 14, 1st,
he also says, “Reason is the primary revelation God has made to
man, necessarily presupposed in every subsequent
revelation of whatever kind . . . Hence no subsequent revelation
can contradict reason acting legitimately within its own sphere
. . . To believe is to assent to a thing as true, but
to see that it contradicts reason, is to see that it is
not (italics his) true.” Again on page 63, 15, 1st,
“The first principles of a true philosophy are presupposed in
all theology, natural and revealed. 2d, The Scriptures, although
not designed primarily to teach philosophy, yet necessarily
presuppose and involve the fundamental principles of a true
philosophy.”
If the complainants object to
Dr. Clark's method as unsound, they must also repudiate
the methods of old Princeton as “out of harmony with
orthodox Presbyterianism.” The Presbytery does not assert that
the Confession requires adherence to everything in the Princeton
apologetic. Other forms of apologetics may also be permitted.
But without specifically amending our standards any
attempt to exalt one method as alone orthodox and to
repudiate all appeal to the a-priori truths of reason is
intolerable.
Here some analysis is required
of the charges of “humanistic intellectualism” later made
against Dr. Clark at two points (P. 7, 3; O. 29; and P.
10, 2; O. 40) and of rationalism in the theological
sense (P. 10, 2; O. 40; and P. 10, 3; O. 41; P. 6, 3; O. 25).
The Complaint does not charge Dr. Clark with the Sophistic
man-measure theory or its modern equivalent, pragmatism. It
is therefore admitted on all hands that Dr. Clark does not make
the human mind the standard of truth. Intellectualism,
as opposed to pragmatism, holds that truth is immutable
and independent of man. Dr. Clark holds the usual form
of intellectualism, that truth is indeed independent of
man, though not independent of God; and this position coupled
with Dr. Clark's acceptance of the Scriptures as the only rule
of faith and practice disposes of the added charge of
rationalism.
While the tenor of the
Complainant is anti-intellectualism, it is hard to find
in a doctrinally conscious Christianity any reason for opposing
intellectualism. The Complaint, however goes further and charges
Dr. Clark with “humanistic” intellectualism. In using
the notion of humanism, the Complainant obviously does not refer
to the Renaissance phenomenon of the study of the
classics or to the modern study of the humanities.
Humanism in modern philosophical terminology is but a
polite term for atheism. Although humanism is predominately
pragmatic and anti-intellectualistic, a theory of humanistic
intellectualism would hold that immutable truth depends neither
upon God nor man, but finally and ultimately upon the spatial,
corporeal universe or some other alleged ground. It is
questionable whether the Complaint really means what it
seems to say in charging Dr. Clark with “humanistic
intellectualism,” for this would be to accuse him of atheism.
Such a charge would be nothing less than calumny and
slander.
Since step two of the argument
of this part of the Complaint depends on or repeats step
one, not much more in the way of a reply is needed. It
ought to be pointed out, however, that step two begins with a
false statement. The Complainant says, “Dr. Clark holds that
man's knowledge of a proposition, if it is really knowledge, is
identical with God's knowledge of the same proposition.”
The complainants refer to seven passages in the transcript to
support their contention. Not one of the seven references says
anything remotely resembling the sentence above, and two
of the seven directly contradict it. Page 18, line 23 of the
transcript is one of these references. The
passage, obviously incorrectly reported in detail, reads, “ I
know of two points, often this subject. That is—the method of
knowledge—knowing, is, in the case of God not acquisitional, but
in our case it is. That is one point of it, and the
only other point that has reference to the subject is: The
object known, such as two times two equals four. I hold that
that is the same as it is for God, but the method of knowing it
is entirely different.” On the same page of the
transcript (18, 5) Dr. Clark had said, “Briefly I should say
that God's knowledge is intuitive and ours
indispersive?” (sic). The other
of the two references expressing essentially the same
thought is 28, 14-22. In other words, Dr. Clark in the
transcript says God's knowledge of a given object is not the
same as man's knowledge of the same object. And the
complainants after reading these passages say that
“Dr. Clark holds that man's knowledge of a
proposition . . . is identical
with God's knowledge of the same proposition.” The Complaint
therefore has attempted to put into Dr. Clark's mouth the very
position he explicitly denied.
In studying this subject one
should be careful to avoid certain apparently common confusions.
Strict accuracy is required. The word knowledge
has two meanings; both are good English; but the
one should never be taken for the other. When one
says, This man has great knowledge, the word refers
to the objects, i.e., the truths or propositions he knows. On
the other hand when one, Man has discursive knowledge, the
word refers, not to the objects known, but to the
manner of knowing. The simple phrase God's knowledge
may bear either meaning, but what is true of one meaning is
not necessarily truth of the other meaning. In the
phrase God's knowledge of a proposition the word knowledge
refers to the intuitional character of his knowing.
It cannot refer to the content known, for if it
did, the phrase could be exactly reproduced as God's object of an object, or God's truth of a truth, or God's proposition of a proposition.
The complainants in attacking Dr. Clark's position are not
concerned with knowledge in the sense of the manner of
knowing. They distinguish and they admit Dr. Clark
distinguishes between intuition and discursion, but
they claim that the manner of God's knowing is no
part of the doctrine of incomprehensibility. Hence the theory
of the Complaint is that the objects or truths known by God
are different from those known by man. Another
possible confusion arises from the ambiguity of the
word meaning. Sometimes meaning
means implication; as for example when one says, The clouds
in the sky tonight mean rain tomorrow. Thus it is
possible to say that God sees more meaning in a
particular proposition than man does because he sees
its far reaching implications. This, however, is not the
meaning of meaning
in this discussion. The Complaint (P. 6, 1-2; O. 23)
definitely sets aside this meaning as irrelevant.
Therefore those who study the Complaint and this
reply must restrict themselves to another and more
basic meaning of meaning.
This more basic meaning is simply the particular truth
itself. The proposition, Two times two are four, apart from
anything it implies, means just what it says. It is
difficult, in fact it is impossible to express the
meaning of this proposition in any terms simpler than
the words, Two times two are four. It is in this sense that
the Complaint asserts that such a proposition has two
different meanings. Though these distinctions are clear and
elementary, experience shows that they are often
confused.
What
Dr. Clark said was that though God's knowledge of a truth is
different from man's knowledge of the same truth, it is none
the less the same truth that they both know; if indeed
man knows anything. The Complaint avers that it is a
prerequisite of ministerial good standing to believe
that God's knowledge and man's knowledge do not
“coincide at any single point” (P. 5, 3; O. 21). It tries to
set up as a test of orthodoxy the denial that man knows even
one truth God knows. If therefore God knows that two
times two are four, and that Christ died for our
sins, man cannot know these propositions. Man and God,
according to the Complaint, cannot know the same truth,
because God's knowledge and man's knowledge do not “coincide
at any single point.” And this view the Complainants are
attempting to make a test of orthodoxy. In reply the
Presbytery wishes to suggest that if man does not
know at least one truth that God knows, if man's
knowledge and God's knowledge do not coincide in at least one
detail, then man knows nothing at all. God knows all truth,
and if man's mind cannot grasp even one truth, then
man's mind grasps no truth. Far from being a test of orthodoxy
this test imposed by the Complaint is nothing else
than skepticism and irrationalism.
The
Church has a right to know what sort of strange doctrine the
Complaint is making a test of orthodoxy. Does it mean that God
in knowing that two times two are four also sees
intuitively the logical connection with some theorem
of higher mathematics not yet discovered by man?
Does the Complaint mean that as God thinks “Christ died
for our sins,” he also understands far-reaching consequences
man has not dreamed of? No, this is not the point the
Complaint is making. As the transcript shows Dr. Clark holds
that God knows all these implications. But this view
of Dr. Clark is what the Complaint rejects as a
“quantitative” view of truth. The Complaint is not
arguing that God knows more propositions. Its point is that
the first proposition itself, viz., two times two are four in
its narrowest and minimal significance, is qualitatively
different for God. What is this qualitative
difference? This is a question the Complaint has not
answered. The ordinarily recognized qualities of
simple propositions are: affirmative, negative, universal,
particular, true, and false. Do the complainants hold that a
proposition which is affirmative for man is negative for God?
Or is a proposition that is true for God false for man? What
the qualitative difference is that they have in mind, they
have not divulged. But if they cannot state clearly
what this qualitative difference is, how can such an
unknown quality be made a test of orthodoxy?
At
any rate the Complaint definitely states that man's knowledge
and God's knowledge “do not coincide at any single
point”. This assertion does not refer to the modes of knowing
truth, as will be made quite evident in step three.
It refers strictly to the truth itself. The
Complaint teaches that any given proposition does not
mean the same thing for God as it means for man. “Two times
two are four” is a given proposition; therefore it means one
thing for man; and something qualitatively different
for God. The truth “Christ died for our sins,” does not have
the same meaning for man and for God. May it mean for God that
Christ did not die for our sins? The complainants
of course would deny that it could quite mean that.
But does not their philosophy give them reason for making such
a denial?
The Complaint teaches that the truth man may have is an analogy of the truth that God has; i.e.,
man may have a resemblance of the truth God has; but he
cannot have God's truth itself. He has only an
analogy of it. The complainants would doubtless say
that we must accept this dogma because God reveals it
in the Bible. But where in the Bible is such a revelation
found? It is not a valid deduction from the Creator-creature
relationship. A valid deduction from this
relationship would be that man can think only God's
thoughts after him and cannot originate thoughts not
already in God's mind. And such thoughts would have to have
the same meaning for both God and man; they would not be mere
analogies of God's meaning. The manner of God's
thinking is different from the thinking processes of
man, but the result of man's thinking, if his
thinking is true, is that he understands at least the one
truth that God thinks. Furthermore, the assumption that man
knows his truth to be analogical of God's truth
because God reveals it to be analogical, results in
startling consequences. How could one know that this
assumption itself is the truth as it is for God? On the
complainants' theory the proposition “the truth man has is
analogical” is itself only an analogy. It is not the truth
that God has. Nor could man know that it was God who was
revealing such a proposition, for again the
proposition “God is revealing that truth is
analogical” is only an analogy of the truth. One can only be
sure that such a proposition is not God's truth. On the
complainants' theory there is no way of ever crossing over
from an analogy of truth to the truth itself. All our thinking
is shutup in analogies and resemblances and cannot
coincide with God's truth at even a single point.
This position really cuts all connection between God's
knowledge and man's knowledge and plunges us into
unmitigated skepticism.
If
the complainants cannot know what God means, how can they know
God does not mean this or that? They affirm that there
is a resemblance or analogy between the truth God
knows and the qualitative different truth man knows.
But by what right do they assert a resemblance when
they cannot describe the qualitative difference? Or, how can
they assert that two things resemble each other when they have
never known and can never know one of them? One can
say that two men resemble each other if one has
seen both men. But one cannot legitmately affirm a
resemblance between a man one has seen and a man one has not
seen. Similarly, if a man knew God's meaning, he could compare
it with his own and remark the similarity or
difference. If I know your opinion, I can say it is
similar to or dissimilar from mine. But if I do not
know your opinion, I have no way of knowing whether your
opinion is the same or contradictory of mine. Similarly if
man's knowledge and God's knowledge do not “coincide at any
single point,” then for all we know, perhaps Christ did not
die for our sins. And the complainants wish to make
their views a test for orthodoxy! Where in the Westminster
Confession of Faith is there any such philosophy?
[During the preparation of this reply, a phrase was noted in The Presbyterian Guardian
to the effect that those who signed the Complaint do not
altogether agree with what it says. On page 351,
column 3, of The Presbyterian Guardian
of December 10, 1944, this sentence appears: “The
complainants, to be sure, have made plain that, on
their view, the knowledge which man may come to
enjoy of a proposition cannot be at variance with the
meaning of a proposition for God, since it must be
analogical.” If, however, the complainants have made this
plain, they have not made it plain in the Complaint. It is in
fact doubtful that they have made it plain anywhere.
They have not made it plain in the editorial from
which the sentence is quoted. Aside from the absense
of any
definition of the word “analogical,” the phrase “at variance
with” is unsatisfactory. The proposition “Joseph was sold into
Egypt” is not at variance with the proposition
“David was a great king.” Are we therefore to suppose that one
of these is analogical of the other and that God
may place the meaning of the first of these propositions upon
the second? If one is interested in a philosophic
theory of knowledge, the phrase “at variance with” does not
solve any epistemological problem. Undefined words and
sweeping phrases do not help one to think clearly. A
moment's reflection will suffice to show that no
true proposition is “at variance with” any other true
proposition. Note the usage of this phrase in the Complaint
(P. 5, 1; O. 18), quoted above in the third paragraph of this
section On Incomprehensibility.
Therefore to say that the meaning God places on a
proposition is not “at variance with” the meaning man finds in
it, is to say very little indeed. The serious
matter, however, is not what the complainants say
they now believe. The serious matter is what they wrote and
signed in the Complaint. If the Orthodox Presbyterian Church
in an unfortunate moment approves the Complaint it will
be the wording of the Complaint that will define
the position of the Church. The Presbytery cannot take into
account the changing views of the complainants as individuals.
It is called on to answer the Complaint. And the action of
the Church in any formal vote will be an action on
the Complaint as written and signed.]
In
step three of the argument the complainants make certain
admissions. They admit (P. 6, 2; O. 23) that Dr. Clark
distinguishes between God's knowing a truth and man's knowing a
truth. But then the complainants fail to give due weight to
these, their own, admissions. Though they admit that Dr. Clark
asserted this distinction, they have argued as if
he had not. They attempt to justify their ignoring
of the evidence. The complainants admit that Dr. Clark makes a
qualitative distinction between God's knowledge and man's
knowledge because he recognizes the fundamental difference
between the mode of God's knowing and that of man.
Then the complainants make the astounding statement, “however,
this admission does not affect the point at issue
here since the doctrine of the mode of the divine
knowledge is not a part of the doctrine of the
incomprehensibility of his knowledge. The latter is concerned
only with the contents of the divine knowlege” (P.
6, 2; O. 23). The complainants actually assert that the mode
of God's knowledge is not a part of the doctrine of
incomprehensibility. One or two quotations from great Reformed
theologians will suffice to disprove this assertion. A great
theologian of the Northern Presbyterian Church, Robert J.
Breckenridge, in his The Knowledge of God Objectively Considered,
(1858), page 275, says “the mode in which the
divine Intelligence conceives all things, distinctively, at
the same time, and by one act, is wholly beyond our
comprehension; that intelligence is therefore
incomprehensible” (cf. pp. 285-287). Dr. Breckenridge says
that the mode of God's knowing is indeed a part of God's
incomprehensibility. Charnock also shows that the complainants
have misunderstood the doctrine of God's
incomprehensibility. In Discourse VIII, On God's Knowledge,
he first speaks of the infinite number of truths God
understands. On page 408 he says, “Who, then, can fathom
that whereof there is no number?” This is the
quantitative of mathematical concept of an infinite
number of propositions which displeases the complainants.
After enumerating through many pages the numberless objects of
God's knowledge, Charnock finally (page 451) comes to the
mode of God's knowing. There he says, “As God
therefore is in being and perfection, infinitely more above a
man than a man is above a beast, the manner of his
knowledge must be infinitely more above a man's
knowledge, than the knowledge of a man is above that of a
beast; our understanding can clasp an object in a moment that
is at a great distance from our sense; our eye, by
one elevated motion, can view the heavens; the
manner of God's understanding must be inconceivably
above our glimmerings; as the manner of his being is
infinitely more perfect than all created understandings.
Indeed, the manner of God's knowledge can no more be
known by us than his essence can be known by us;
and the same incapacity in man, which renders him unable to
comprehend the being of God, renders him as unable to
comprehend the manner of God's understanding.” And then
follows a discussion of the manner of God's knowing
in which the usual distinction between intuition and
discursion is made, as Dr. Clark made it I his examination.
In the face of this the Complaint asserts that the mode
of God's knowing is not a part of the doctrine of
incomprehensibility, and on the basis of this ex cathedra announcement tries to justify its ignoring and distorting of the evidence.
The
numerous quotations made by the complainants at the beginning
of their argument will now be seen to have little to
do with the charges against Dr. Clark. In general,
the quotations say that man's knowledge is finite, limited,
and partial; it differs from God's knowledge not
merely in degree but also in kind. “To comprehend,”
say Charles Hodge, “is to have a complete and exhaustive
knowledge of an object.” But the quotations provide no basis
for asserting that God cannot express himself in
words; that words cannot inspire any recognition by
man of his relation to God; that the statements in
the Bible mean one thing for man and something qualitatively
different for God; or that the mode of God's knowing is not a
part of the doctrine of God's comprehensibility.
The
Presbytery must emphasize that on these matters concerning the
philosophic implications of God's knowledge and man's
knowledge very little has been written by Reformed
theologians. It is a field of doctrine that is
almost unexplored. In fact it is remarkable how
little appears in print on the subject beyond the first
generalities. In view of this situation it is highly improper
for the Complainant to dogmatize. It may be that this
discussion will further the search for the truth,
but it most certainly calls for caution and humility
rather than for a Complaint.
In
conclusion the Presbytery believes that this section of the
Complaint utterly fails to prove that Dr. Clark is out of
accord with the system of doctrine taught in the
Westminster Confession of Faith; the items which the
complainants insist upon are far removed from the
system of doctrine of the Confession; they are not strictly
theological doctrines at all, but tenuous implications from
these doctrines; and the implications may well be fallacious.
Therefore this section of the Complaint fails to
show that the Presbytery of Philadelphia was in
error in licensing and ordaining Dr. Clark.
On Intellect, Will, and Emotions
The second theological section
of the Complaint treats of two subjects: first, the problem of
emotions in God; and, second, the problem of the
relation between man's intellectual activity and his emotional
and volitional activities. The first of these problems is
discussed on pages 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, and 36 of the Complaint.
The Answer will consider this problem before commencing
discussion of the remainder of pages 25-41, in which the
complainants state their views of the second problem.
The dispute takes its rise from
the statement in the Confession that “God is without
body, parts, or passions.” The continental creeds generally do
not contain this phrase. It is found in the Irish Articles of
1615, and seems to have been adopted by the Westminster
Assembly from the Thirty Nine Articles of 1563. The first of
these Articles says, “Deus aeternus, incorporeus, impartibilis,
impassibilis,” i.e., “God, everlasting, without body, parts, or
passions.” As the Latin text was definitive, and as the meaning
of impassibilis in
the previous history of philosophy and theology is
fairly clear, the basic theological problem is whether or not
an emotional God is impassibilis. [See: Thirty-nine Articles of Religion: Article I. --Charlie].
The
concept of passion or passibility as a technical term, here
denied of God, was originated by Aristotle. His basic
definition in Metaphysics
D 21 is, “'Affection' means (1) a quality in
respect of which a thing can be altered . . . (2)
the already actualized alterations; (3) especially,
injurious alterations and movements, and, above all, painful
injuries; (4) experiences pleasant or painful, when on a large
scale, are called 'affections.'” In De Anima III, 3, 429 a 7, he uses the same word for emotions. Cf. Notes, R. D. Hicks, in Aristotle, De Anima, 403 a 16. St. Augustine lists (Confessions X,
22) lust, happiness, fear, and sadness as the four
perturbations or passions of the soul. Descartes wrote a Treatise on the Passions of the Soul.
He lists six basic passions: admiration, love,
hate, desire, joy and sadness; and connects them
closely with bodily disturbances. Very obviously
emotions are included in the sphere of passions. In the
history of theology, philosophy, and language, therefore, it
is not unusual, rather it is usual, to find emotions
classed as one species of the genus passion.
Passion is the wider term and emotion is included
under it. Therefore, the complainants ought not to object to
this linguistic usage. They may themselves wish to define the
terms so as to exclude emotion from passion. Let
them do so: They have no right to object to the more
usual usage. Emotion, therefore, as Dr. Clark
defines it, is included in the concept of passion which the
Confession denies to God.
The
Complaint (P. 8, 1; O. 29) suggests that Dr. Clark's
definition of emotion is an a priori oddity. If this were
true, which it is not, still there would be no
ground for complaint. The confusion in the argument
of the Complaint becomes obvious by an analysis of the
definition of emotion which the complainants wish to
substitute for Dr. Clark's definition. The complainants want
to define emotion as (P. 8, 1; O. 30), “something
which arouses the will and thus determines action.” From this
definition follows one of two consequences. First, if the term
retains any of its colloquial connotations, then anger and
hate may determine actions, for colloquially they are
emotions; but the cool, unemotional calculation of a
business venture could never arose the will, for such an
activity is intellectual. Or, second, if the complainants
admit that considerations of truth sometimes influence
conduct, then they are guilty of the a priori oddity
of calling intellectual activity an emotion. The
desire to substitute another definition of emotion for
Dr. Clark's definition is not a proper ground for complaint.
The
final reference to this subject is (P. 9, 2-3; O. 36), “A
recollection of Dr. Clark's forthright denial of anything that
might be called 'emotion' in God, cited above, will thus
impress us that he not only does violence to the
Scriptural and Reformed doctrine . . .” Dr. Clark
never made any “forthright denial of anything that might
be called 'emotion' in God.” Love or wrath “might be called an
emotion.” Dr. Clark did not deny love and wrath to God. He
holds that while some people might call God's love and
wrath emotions, it is better to classify them as
volitions. In this Dr. Clark is accord with a large
section of the history of theology, and even of literary
usage. As an example of literature (not of Reformed theology),
it is possible to cite Pascal on page 24 of Everyman's
translation: “It is natural for the mind to believe,
and for the will to love.” As an example of
Calvinistic thought these phrases of Augustus Toplady
are appropriate (Complete Works,
1869, pp. 106, 107, and 687): God “is not, for instance,
irascible and appeasable; liable to the emotions of joy
and sorrow; or in any respect passive.” “When love
is predicated of God, we do not mean that he is possessed of
it as a passion or affection. . . . Love, therefore,
when attributed to him signifies . . . his everlasting will,
purpose, and determination to deliver, bless and
save his people.”
R. L. Dabney, Syllabus and Notes, 1927, page 153, supports Dr. Clark's views in a particularly clear manner:
“Our
Confession says, that God hath neither parts nor
passions. That He has something analogous to what
are called in man active principles, is manifest,
for He will and acts; therefore He must feel. But these active
principles must not be conceived of as emotions, in the sense
of ebbing and flowing accesses of feeling. In other words,
they lack that agitation and rush, that change from
cold to hot, and hot to cold, which constitute the
characteristics of passion in us. They are, in God,
an ineffable, fixed, peaceful, unchangeable calm, although the
springs of volition. That such principles may be, although
incomprehensible to us, we may learn from this fact: That
in the wisest and most sanctified creatures, the active
principles have least of passion and agitation, and yet they
are by no means become inefficacious as springs of
action—e.g., moral indignation in the holy and wise
parent or ruler. That the above conception of the
calm immutability of God's active principles is necessary,
appears from the following: The agitations of literal passions
are incompatible with His blessedness. The objects of those
feelings are as fully present to the Divine Mind at
one time as another; so that there is nothing to
cause ebb or flow. And that ebb would constitute a
change in Him. When, therefore, the Scriptures speak of God as
becoming wroth, as repenting, as indulging His fury against
His adversaries, in connection with some particular
event occurring in time, we must understand them
anthropologically. What is meant is, that the
outward manifestations of His active principles were as
though these feelings then arose.”
The
evidence in the Complaint is that the complainants know and
admit that Dr. Clark is in agreement with the
Confession. On page 51 the complainants admit: “In
this connection reference must again be made to Dr.
Clark's view that God has no emotions. If his definition
of emotion be granted, God certainly has none.”
In other words, the complainants know and admit that when Dr.
Clark says that God has no emotions, his thought is correct.
And yet knowing this, they spend some six pages trying to
represent him as seriously out of accord with the
Confession.
The second problem of this
section is one of human psychology, and its discussion
will again underline the fact that the Complaint is not a
matter of the doctrines of the Westminster Confession but of
technical and abstruse subtleties more suitable for philosophers
than for preachers. The charge made against Dr. Clark is that
he arranges the several types of the soul's activities
in a hierarchical scheme with the intellectual acts as
the highest. This position, the complainants assert, is
“humanistic intellectualism” (P. 7, 3; O. 29). That the
position is a form of intellectualism is not denied;
that it is humanistic is a charge so completely at variance with
the evidence that it could only have been made in a moment of
rashness. The complainants virtually give their case away, for
they quote (P.8, 3; O. 32) Calvin, Institutes
I, xv, 6-8, as saying “the intellect rules the will”; and
then they try to argue that he did not mean it. A summary of
these sections of Calvin may prove instructive.
Calvin
begins these sections on human psychology by singling out
Plato as the heathen philosopher who more clearly than
the others saw that the soul id immortal. He makes a
brief mention of the soul's relation to the body,
and emphasizes that the soul with its innate knowledge,
including the seeds of religion, find its chief purpose in
worshipping God. He then analyzes the soul. He repudiates the
theory that man has two souls, a sensitive one and a rational
one. But the whole discussion he prefers to leave to
philosophers as being rather remote from theology. Yet he does
not prohibit the study of such philosophy and in
fat finds it useful and entertaining. He then
sketches the usual Aristotelian hierarchy of the soul's
functions: the special senses, the common sense, the
imagination, the reason, and lastly, the
understanding. This scheme of itself is sufficient
to show that Calvin placed intellectual activity at the apex
of the soul's functions. It becomes still more clear as we
proceed. The will, he continues, chooses what the
reason and the understanding propose to it; the
irascible faculty apprehends objects presented by
imagination and sensation. All this is strictly a form of
intellectualism. Calvin admits that such discussions are
obscure, and if someone prefers a different distribution of
the powers of the soul, he will not object, for the
discussion hardly touches any article of faith. He
even suggests a simpler division that would suit
him: “the human soul has two faculties which relate to our
present design, the understanding and the will. Now, let it be
the office of the understanding to discriminate
between objects as they shall respectively appear
deserving of approbation or disapprobation; but of
the will to choose and follow what the understanding shall
have pronounced good.” The understanding, he continues, is
“the guide and governor of the soul; the will always
respects its authority and waits for its judgment.” Beyond
these “no power can be found in the soul which may not
properly be referred to either one or the other of
these two members,” i.e.,
the will or the understanding. (Emotion is not mentioned.)
And to emphasize the primacy of the intellect still
more, Calvin applies to it the Stoic term to hegimonikon, the principal or governing part. So far Calvin.
Thus it is obvious that Calvin is far from holding the theory of the complainants. Their theory is not well worked out in the Complaint, but clearly they reject the notion that the intellect has any superiority over the emotions. The Complaint (P. 8, 3; O. 32) says, “both Calvin (!) and Bavinck insist on the total activity of the human being in religion, with no subordination of one faculty to another.” It also speaks (P. 9, 1; O. 34), “of equal function of man's various faculties.” And it also says (P. 9, 2; O. 35), “Again, there are three equally important and lofty functions.” Obviously therefore the complainants hold that emotion and intellection are exactly on the same level; there is no superiority or subordination at all. But if this theory were true, if emotion and intellection are equally lofty, then it would be a matter of indifference whether one followed one's anger or his sober judgment of truth. If emotion is not subordinated to the intellect, then emotion could reject one's own best thought—through despair or fear—with as much right as the intellect could judge such despair or fear unfounded. In fact if emotion were the equal of the understanding, there would be no need of the understanding to direct conduct or to judge between right and wrong: emotion could govern us just as well. And this theory of the complainants is what they wish to make a test of orthodoxy! They ask Presbytery to declare various decisions and acts null and void because the man involved agrees with Calvin rather than with some more modern tendencies.
Thus it is obvious that Calvin is far from holding the theory of the complainants. Their theory is not well worked out in the Complaint, but clearly they reject the notion that the intellect has any superiority over the emotions. The Complaint (P. 8, 3; O. 32) says, “both Calvin (!) and Bavinck insist on the total activity of the human being in religion, with no subordination of one faculty to another.” It also speaks (P. 9, 1; O. 34), “of equal function of man's various faculties.” And it also says (P. 9, 2; O. 35), “Again, there are three equally important and lofty functions.” Obviously therefore the complainants hold that emotion and intellection are exactly on the same level; there is no superiority or subordination at all. But if this theory were true, if emotion and intellection are equally lofty, then it would be a matter of indifference whether one followed one's anger or his sober judgment of truth. If emotion is not subordinated to the intellect, then emotion could reject one's own best thought—through despair or fear—with as much right as the intellect could judge such despair or fear unfounded. In fact if emotion were the equal of the understanding, there would be no need of the understanding to direct conduct or to judge between right and wrong: emotion could govern us just as well. And this theory of the complainants is what they wish to make a test of orthodoxy! They ask Presbytery to declare various decisions and acts null and void because the man involved agrees with Calvin rather than with some more modern tendencies.
To
show that Calvin and Dr. Clark are not alone in holding their
position, a few quotations without discussion are here added.
Note that the intellect is placed first, the will
second, and note that the emotions receive a rather
minor emphasis.
Charnock, Discourse IV,
On Spiritual Worship, page 210: “With the same powers of our
soul whereby we contemplate God, we must also worship God; we
cannot think of him but with our minds, nor love him
but with our will; and we cannot worship him
without the acts of thinking and loving.” Ibid., page
211: “This excellent Being was to be honored with the motions
of the understanding and will, with the purest and
most spiritual powers in the nature of man.” “Prayer
(i.e., vain
prayer), is muttered over in private, slightly, as a parrot
learns lessons by rote, not understanding what it speaks, or
to what end it speaks it; not glorifying God in
thought and spirit, with understanding and will.” Ibid., page 212: “A sincere act of the mind and will . . . was required by God.” Ibid.,
page 248: “He bestows upon man a spiritual nature, that he
may return to him a spiritual service; he enlightens the
understanding, that he may have a rational service; and
new moulds the will that he may have a voluntary
service.” Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology,
Vol. II, page 99, says: “His (man's) reason was
subject to God; his will was subject to his reason;
his affections and appetites to his will.” See also the
quotation from Breckenridge, below. These considerations
show that Dr. Clark's view of the intellect, will, and
emotions follows a distinguished line of Reformed theology.
The argument so far is quite
sufficient to dispose of this section of the Complaint,
but certain minor insinuations and misrepresentations ought to
be noted in passing to prevent the Church from attributing
to Dr. Clark the implications that the complainants attempt to
force on him.
First, there is a certain method
of argumentation that is pervasively prejudicial. The Complaint
continually quotes standard theologians and makes
statements of sound theology in a manner calculated to give
the impression that Dr. Clark does not accept these standard
positions. It would be laborious to examine each case
separately. But since the Complaint misrepresents Dr. Clark when
it cites evidence (and the evidence often contradicts what is
asserted), the reader should be wary of accepting as
true insinuations without evidence. Second, the Complaint says
(P. 7, 2; O. 27), “The activity of the will which Dr. Clark
subordinates to intellection seems to be little more
than 'a voluntary act of paying attention,' which
results in an intellectual apprehension (29:3-4).” However the
transcript contradicts this assertion. The transcript (29:3-4)
reads, “The intellectual apprehension is the result of a
voluntary act of paying attention. You cannot know anything
unless by an act of will, and yet, the knowing itself is
an act of intellectual apprehension because of its volitional
aspects.” The last five words of this quotation from the
transcript do not make sense, yet the preceding part of
the sentence is clear. It says that with every
intellectual act there must be a voluntary act of paying
attention. From this familiar Augustinian position the
complainants deduce the absurd conclusion that the only action
of the will is a voluntary paying of attention. One
might as well argue that since some Greeks are
Athenians, all Greeks are Athenians. The complainants argue that
since intellectual apprehension requires voluntary attention,
there is no other form of volitional activity. Aside from
historical background and aside from questions of logic the
transcript itself furnished sufficient evidence to show
the falsity of the assertion now under discussion. In
the transcript (17, 3), Dr. Clark refers to the fourth
commandment as an object for voluntary obedience; and on
pag 32, 4 he mentions the eighth commandment as requiring an act
of obedience. Obviously obedience to these is not merely
voluntary attention to their words so as to understand them.
Such attention is necessary but it is not the only form
of volitional action.
A third of these minor
points—minor for the purpose of refuting the
Complaint—is the attempt to understand Dr. Clark as predicating
of God the same hierarchical relationship as the discussion has
attributed to man. Now, aside from denying emotional upsets to
God, and this is good Reformed theology, Dr. Clark said
nothing about the relation of intellect and will in God.
But the general argument (P. 8, 1-2; O. 30, 31),
proceeds on the assumption that Dr. Clark asserts a
primacy of the intellect in God as well as in man. Because of
this underlying assumption they assert (P. 8, 2; O. 31),
“Reformed theology seems to be barren of any references to a
primacy of the intellect in God. In fact, every
indication is that whatever distinguishable faculties exist in
God are equally fundamental, equally prominent, equally
significant, and of equal functional level.” Since Dr. Clark
made no remarks on the subject, the argument is beside the
point. But since the complainants have introduced such
extraneous matter, it is wise to include in this reply the
quotation from Breckenridge referred to above.
Robert J. Breckenridge, The Knowledge of God Objectively Considered, 1858, page 289, writes:
“Intellect
and Will appertain exclusively to that which is
spiritual; and Power is inseparable from our primary
conception of Will, directed by Intelligence. When we add to
the infinite spirit thus endowed, Wisdom and Knowledge as
infinite as they, and all as infinite as the essence
of which all of them are Attributes; we may be said to have
as complete a conception as we can entertain of the sublime
outline of God's rational
nature, considered separately as far as we are able to do so.
Whatever may be the nature of that ineffaceable distinction,
which we express by The True and The False;
it is inconceivable that such a Being should not eternally
perceive it and eternally respect it. If his own
nature is the foundation of the distinction, then
the distinction is commensurate with his Being; that is, it is
an infinite and eternal distinction. It is in the
light of that distinction that our rational faculties take
cognizance of whatever is submitted to them; it is on its
reality that all increase in knowledge and all
growth in wisdom on our part depend. Without it, it is not
easy, if it be possible, to affix any idea to what
we call Intelligence; and if it be obliterated, we obliterate
at the same time the distinction between Good and Evil,
since the Good is always the True, and the Evil is always the
False. It is thus the rational nature of God underlies the
moral nature of God; and while both aspects of his
Being afford the most distinct means of surveying
and comprehending it, the rational goes before the
moral.” Ibid.,
page 426: “Passing to the moral nature of God, and to such
infinite Perfections as Love, attended by Goodness and Mercy,
and ordained in Justice and Longsuffering, we
readily see the connection of all such affections
with the divine Will: and as we contemplate in man's moral
nature the image of this moral nature of God, we perceive the
same connections of these moral qualities with each
other, and with his Will.”
As
a matter of fact Dr. Clark does not hold to a primacy of the
intellect in God, but the above quotation shows that contrary
to the assertion of the Complaint, this view has
appeared in Reformed theology.
A
fourth of these minor points is the accusation that Dr. Clark
“studiously avoided answering” a certain question (P. 8, 1; O.
30); the reference being to page 16 of the transcript. Dr.
Clark did not studiously avoid answering any question. The
question as reported in the transcript is as follows:
“Q.
When the Confession of Faith says: 'God is without body,
parts, or passions,' does it mean God is lacking in
feeling or emotion? A. It does. Q. I'll define feelings and
emotions: I mean—affection is the sense of principle
activity with reference to objections. Now I'll repeat
the question if you wish. A. Go ahead. Q. And by feeling or
emotion I mean—in the sense of principal activity with
reference to objects. A. I forget which way to answer that—yes
or no. Q. The Confession of Faith says: 'God is
without body, or parts.' A. The answer is yes, but I
protest against the awful English of your statement, the
word: 'emotion'--never mind that English. Q. You
mean that God has never acted upon anything aside from
himself? A. I don't understand you. Q. What I would like to
know is this: We can call these feelings or emotions
in God, and I would define them as analogous to our
feelings and emotions and affections in the sense
that that they are active principles, active with reference to
objects. For example: God is angry with the wicked; God loves
his people eternally; would you deny that? A. That is right,
right; What you say is right. Q. That is what the Confession
means? A. No, what—not what it means right there—not what the
Confession means.
Obviously
Dr. Clark was merely telling the truth when he said, “I don't
understand you.” The question is virtually unintelligible.
There is no evidence of intent to avoid an answer. The
transcript shows that Dr. Clark holds that God is
angry with the wicked, that God eternally loves his
people; but this is not what the Confession is
talking about when it says God is without body, parts, or
passions.
Fifth
and last: the Complaint asserts (P. 10, 2; O. 40), Dr. Clark
does not deny the necessity or fact of regeneration
but he makes no absolute qualitative distinction
between the knowledge of the unregenerate man and
the knowledge of the regenerate man. With the same ease, the
same 'common sense,' the unregenerate and the regenerate man
can understand propositions revealed to man (p. 20;
28:13-16; 31:13-17; 34:13-35:2).” If the
complainants had quoted these passages from the
transcript instead of merely referring to them, everyone could
have seen that all but the last have nothing to do with the
matter of regeneration, and that the last is
contradictory of their assertion. The discussion had centered
on the proposition “two times two equals four.” Dr.
Clark had asserted that any man who knows this
proposition knows it by means of the definitions of the
numbers and by the laws of logic. Then the transcript
continues:
Q.
Where do we get those laws of logic? A. 'Every man that cometh
into the world.' (Obviously the transcript omits part of the
quotation.) [Charlie's note: see John 1:9 KJV].
Q. Is it possible that by the effective sin, man
will not be able to deduce by the propositions
concerning God? A. That is often the case.”
In
other words, the complainants imply that Dr. Clark holds that
regeneration does not renew the mind or that sin has not
affected it; whereas Dr. Clark said specifically that sin
often causes men to commit logical fallacies. Thus
the complainants cite evidence that is not only
irrelevant, but also evidence that contradicts their
charge. Some further study of the knowledge of a regenerate
man and of an unregenerate man might prove profitable, but the
subject can be accorded only the briefest mention.
Both the regenerate and the unregenerate can with
the same ease understand the proposition, Christ
died for sinners. Regeneration, in spite of the theory of the
Complaint, is not a change in the understanding of these
words. The difference between the regenerate and the
unregenerate lies in the fact that the former
believes the proposition and the latter does not.
The regenerate acknowledges Christ as Lord; the other does
not. The one is a willing subject; the other is a rebel.
Regeneration is not necessarily a change in understanding
propositions. An unregenerate man may understand the
proposition that “Christ died for sinner,” but far
from knowing it to be true, he thinks it to be
false. Strictly speaking he knows only that “the Scriptures
teach Christ died for sinners.” When he is regenerated, his
understanding of the proposition may undergo no change at all;
what happens is that he now accepts as true what previously
he merely understood. He no longer knows merely “the
Scriptures teach Christ died for sinners”; he now
knows “Christ died for sinners.” Nothing in these
considerations is intended to suggest that regeneration is
here completely described. These remarks only bear
briefly on the change of knowledge involved in regeneration.
The renewal of the original image of God and the Spirit's
implantation of new “habits” would require extended
treatment.
The
complainants continue with their accusation, saying “there is
not one shred of evidence that man's religious
activity undergoes any qualitative change through
regeneration.” This accusation is more sweeping than
the former; the former referred only to change in
knowledge and understanding, while this is an accusation that
covers all religious activity. But the admission of the
Complaint itself that “Dr. Clark does not deny the
necessity or fact of regeneration,” undermines its whole
position on this matter. To grasp the situation
correctly, it must be noted first that the examination before
Prebytery did not concern the matter of regeneration. There is
no reason therefore to expect much on the subject
in the transcript. In the six hour examination at the March
meeting of the Presbytery, Dr. Clark satisfied the Presbytery
on this subject as well as on the remainder of the Confession
so that there was no need to repeat the matter. The
complainants wanted to discuss these other
philosophical subtleties, with the result that the
transcript contains little on regeneration. And in these
circumstances, the complainants now charge Dr. Clark with
“rationalism, humanistic intellectualism . . . vicious
independence from God” (P. 10, 2; O. 40). As there is little
evidence in the transcript, it may be permissible to
refer to some of Dr. Clark's writings. In another
section of the Complaint the complainants make such a
reference; and presumeably this answer to the Complaint may
do the same. This then is what Dr. Clark says in his Readings in Ethics, pp. 115-118.
“But
Christianity has not merely a totally different aim
but a radically opposed one. In the New Testament
instead of the development of the natural abilities
the desirable thing is found to be the death of the natural
man and the birth of a new and supernatural man. The death of
the old nature is necessary because of its
corruption. Even before birth every individual is
implicated in Adam's original sin and alienated from
the life of God. 'The carnal mind is enmity against God, for
it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. So
then they that are in the flesh cannot please God.'
The result is that all have sinned, there is none
righteous or capable of pleasing God in any respect
whatever . . . . This new birth is accomplished not by
the will of man but by the will of God which gives to those
who believe on his only begotten Son the power to become the
sons of God . . . . Since then man must be redeemed
from sin by the blood of Jesus before he can live a
truly moral life, the chief end of man will not be
the development of his corrupt, unspiritual nature.”
And
these are the words of one whom the complainants charge with
“humanistic intellectualism” and “vicious independence from
God.”
On Sovereignty and Responsibility
The third theological section
of the Complaint runs from page 42 to page 50, and
treats of the paradox of divine sovereignty and human
responsibility. The charge made is that Dr. Clark “has done
decided violence to the latter,” i.e. responsibility.
But a study of the Complaint fails to discover any evidence
that Dr. Clark has denied or done violence to human
responsibility; and there is no comparison
between Dr. Clark's view and the Westminster
Confession. There is simply no evidence.
The
complainants instead of supporting their charge have used
the space to object to Dr. Clark's statement that
responsibility and sovereignty do not appear contradictory
to him. The complainants hold that
responsibility and sovereignty ought to appear contradictory
to everyone. This raises two questions: Does the
Scripture encourage us to attempt the solution of paradoxes?
And, does the Scripture provide any hints for the
solution of this particular paradox?
With
respect to the first of these questions it may be noted that
the Westminster Confession I, vi, says, “The
whole counsel of God, concerning all things
necessary for his own glory, man's salvation,
faith and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture,
or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from
Scripture.” The Confession, therefore, instead
of considering a logical approach to Scripture
as rationalistic, approves of logical deductions from
Scripture; in fact, the Confession is itself largely a set
of such deductions. B. B. Warfield in Revelation and Inspiration,
page 12, says, “But revelation, after all, is the correlate
of understanding and has as its proximate end
just the production of knowledge, though not, of
course, knowledge for its own sake, but for the
sake of salvation.” How can anyone suppose that God would
reveal to man something irrational or non-understandable? To
be sure there are “some things hard to be
understood,” but if the Bible actually reveals
God, it cannot be non-understandable. God commands
us to search the Scriptures; we are encouraged to
understand. Calvin, Institutes,
III, xxi, 3, replies to those who think one ought not to
investigate the doctrine of predestination, by
pointing out that such an attitude is in effect a
charge that God did not know how much he should
reveal. No doubt this doctrine, and all doctrines, should be
studied with care and caution; but the Scriptures nowhere
prohibit us from attempting to solve revealed
paradoxes. Nearly any two propositions could
appear contradictory to someone, the less a person has
studied the Bible, the more likely he is to encounter
difficulties; and the advice usually given is to
study further and understand more. The
Complaint may easily be interpreted to preclude all further
progress in the understanding of God's revealed word. The
position of Presbyterianism, however, has never been that
the confessions of faith are the ultimate of
man's understanding of the Scriptures. The
Complaint seems to imply that those who seek to advance
theological knowledge through exegesis of and deduction from
the word of God are thereby guilty of heresy.
Such a position is to be rejected.
Conversely,
anyone who argues that a given revealed paradox cannot be
solved is virtually claiming omniscience. He who
says a given paradox cannot be solved, logically
implies that he has examined every verse in
Scripture, that he has exhausted every implication of every
verse, and that there is in all this no hint of a solution.
Such a person must have a tremendous knowledge
of the Bible. And this is exactly what the
complainants claim. They assert (P. 12, 1; O.46) “Not
even Holy Scripture offers a solution.” This is a claim to
an exhaustive knowledge of all Scripture. Certainly it
is more modest to believe that one has solved a
paradox than to assert that it cannot be solved.
It is true that certain theologians have called
this paradox insoluable; but if Scripture does not forbid,
this is no reason why other men should not attempt to solve
it.
Furthermore,
to solve a paradox may not be such a superhuman task as the
complainants seem to think. They say (P. 12, 1; O. 46) “Dr.
Clark asserts unblushingly that for his
thinking the problem has ceased being a
problem.” The apparent intention is to make Dr. Clark
claim that there remain no problems connected is to make Dr.
Clark claim that there remain no problems to be
connected with sovereignty and responsibility.
Many problems remain. The one problem that Dr.
Clark thinks he has solved is the anti-christian allegation
that sovereignty and responsibility are contradictories. To
say, even mistakenly, that one can show they do
not contradict each other, is not to say that
one knows everything about the subject.
The
second question was, Does the Scripture provide any hints
for the solution of this particular paradox? Dr.
Clark thinks he has found the key to such a
solution. He may be wrong, but how can the complainants,
lacking omniscience, assert that there is none at all?
Before A.D. 325 someone might have said that the Scriptural
teaching on the Father, Son, and Spirit is
self-contradictory. But Athanasius solved that
paradox—without exhausting the subject of the Trinity. The
two natures of Christ might have appeared contradictory in
those early days; but the Council of Chalcedon solved that
paradox. In the history of secular logic certain
problems were, during the Middle Ages, called
insolubilia. But in 1850 an English logician thought he
had found the solution. He had not; but he had made a start
toward the solution, and later logicians improved
upon him, until today logicians do not consider
the insolubilia insoluable. It is just possible
that Dr. Clark, even if mistaken, may have discovered a hint
leading to a solution. He claims, at any rate, that the
solution lies almost on the surface of Calvin's
Institutes. To develop Calvin's hint, one must
readjust Calvin's exegesis of Romans 9. Calvin, as the
complainants are careful to quote, says that Romans 9:20
is a preliminary answer, and that the verses toward the end
of the chapter and the following chapter are the beginning
of a more fundamental solution. Dr. Clark, on
the contrary, thinks that Romans 9:20 is the fundamental and ultimate principle, as Calvin virtually admits in the Institutes,
III, xxiii, 2; and that the later section consists of
deductions, applications, or elaborations. This would
not be the only instance of a lack of complete
consistency between Calvin's Commentary and his
Institutes.
Since
everyone makes mistakes in exegesis, it is beside the point
whether Dr. Clark is right or wrong on this
point. All that should be of concern to the
Presbytery is whether Dr. Clark asserts both sovereignty
and responsibility. The fact that he attempts to
solve the paradox is itself proof that he accepts both
propositions. The complainants try to compare Dr. Clark with
the Arminians and the Antinomians (P. 12, 1-2; O. 47).
These two groups, the complainants claim, also
attempted to solve this paradox. But in fact neither of
these groups tried to solve the paradox. Paradoxes are not
solved, they are merely denied, by rejecting one of
the parts. The Arminians rejected absolute
predestination; the Antinomians rejected morality. In
neither case were two apparently contradictory propositions
shown to be inconsistent. Each group simply denied one of
the two propositions. This is not what Dr. Clark has done;
he has asserted both and has tried to show that
they are consistent. Now, the complainants do
not charge Dr. Clark with Arminianism; they charge
him with Antinomianism. (P. 12, 2; O. 48). For those who
wish to judge further of this charge, since there is no
evidence for it in the Complaint, the Presbytery
draws attention to Dr. Clark's eight-page tract on Romans VI, distributed by our Committee on Christian Education.
It
is pertinent to note that Dr. Clark, instead of approaching
these problems on a rationalistic basis, reaches
his conclusion from an exegesis of Scripture.
As
in the other sections of the Complaint, here too there are
incidental misrepresentations and fallacious
inferences.
For
example, there seems to be the impression that it is
unorthodox to quote the Stoics because they were heathen.
Aside from the fact that Calvin borrowed parts
of his psychology from Plato, Aristotle, and the
Stoics, one might also ponder Acts 17:28-29, where the Apostle Paul approves a certain Stoic teaching on the nature of God.
Next,
the attempt to find a deeper study of the Scripture the
solution of paradoxes—a use of exegesis that the
complainants call rationalism—is in the eyes of the
complainants incompatible with subjection of
human reason to the divine word (P.12, 1; O. 47). In
other words, a man who tries to understand what God has
revealed to him cannot be subject to the revelation, and if
the more he understands, the less he is subject; probably
the less he understands, the more subject he is; so that the
really obedient and devout man must be
completely ignorant. By what right do the complainants imply
that the attempt to understand Scripture is
inconsistent with believing Scripture?
Again,
the complainants assert that Dr. Clark “sever (s) human
responsibility from human freedom” (P. 12, 3; O. 49). But a
study of Dr. Clark's article shows that he accepts
Hodge's conception of “free moral agency”; he
rejects that freedom of contrary choice on which
the Arminians wish to base responsibility. It should be
noted that “human freedom” has many meanings. It may mean
political freedom, freedom from mechanical causation,
freedom of the will from the intellect, freedom from sin,
freedom of contrary choice, freedom from God,
and free moral agency. When an author argues for
or against “freedom,” the critic should determine which
freedom the author means. To apply to one meaning of freedom
what the author says of another meaning of freedom, as the
complainants do here, is not scholarly procedure.
In
view of all these considerations the Presbytery concludes
that this section of the Complaint fails to prove its
charge.
On the Offer of the Gospel
The last theological section of
the Complaint treats of the offer of the gospel. Since
the answer to the Complain is already so voluminous,
brevity at the end might be appreciated. And brevity will be
sufficient, for once again the basic accusation is rationalism,
and this accusation has already been refuted.
Once again also the complainants
show their unwillingness to be satisfied with the
wording of the Westminster Confession. In the first section
of the Complaint they were not satisfied with the statement of
the Confession on the incomprehensibility of God, but wished
to impose on it a strange mystical irrationalism; in the
second section they were unwilling to be satisfied with
the Westminster doctrine which excludes passions from God's
consciousness: admitting that Dr. Clark's view is correct,
nevertheless they attack it; in the third section the
complainants show themselves dissatisfied with the Confession's
encouragement of a logical or rational approach to Scripture:
here again the complainants take a position that reduces
to irrationalism; and now in the last section they ignore the
Confession, and appeal to an earlier and inferior creed.
The Church should note that Dr.
Clark is in full accord with the Westminster Confession on the
offer of the gospel. The Confession VII, iii, states:
“Man, by his fall, having made himself incapable of life
by that covenant, the Lord was pleased to make a second,
commonly called the covenant of grace: wherein he freely
offereth unto sinners life and salvation by Jesus Christ,
requiring of them faith in him, that they may be saved;
and promising to give unto all those that are ordained
unto life, his Holy Spirit, to make them willing and able to
believe.” With this Dr. Clark is in full accord. The
complainants, however, were not satisfied with Dr. Clark's
acceptance of the Confession's statement, but insisted on the
word sincere in describing the offer of the gospel.
Now as the Complaint (P. 13, 1;
O. 51) admits, the word “sincere” is of little significance in
any particular phrase because God is sincere in everything he
does. There was no need of the Westminster divines'
using it; and there was no need of the complainants using
it. It is superfluous. This was one of two reasons for Dr.
Clark's reluctance to use the term. It has been made clear how
necessary it is to define terms accurately. The
qualitative difference between the truth of a
proposition for man and the same truth for God remains
undefined in the Complaint. The word “emotion” is defined
carelessly. In this case also Dr. Clark could not know what
meaning was to be placed on the word “sincere.” And for this
reason he refused to use it. The second reason is closely allied
with the first. Because the word “sincere” is of such general
application and can be used with various connotations, the
Arminians have used it to distinguish their doctrine
from ours. The Lutherans do the same thing with the word
“earnestly.” According to W. G. Polack, in The Building of a Great Church,
page 151, the Missouri Synod in 1881 adopted the following
point among others: “We believe, teach, and confess
that God has loved the world from eternity, has
created all men for salvation and none for
damnation, and earnestly desires the salvation of all men.”
These
then are the words used by the enemies of Calvinism to make it
appear odious. Dr. Clark's refusal to use such
words springs from his desire not to be charged with
Arminianism. He seems to have been successful, for
Arminianism is one accusation the complainants do not
make.
The
Church would do well to compare the careless questions of the
complainants in examining Dr. and their careless language in
the Complaint with the excellent precision of a careful
theologian like R. L. Dabney. In his Syllabus and Notes (p. 559), he says:
“Fifth:
When we assert this sincere compassion of God in His common
calls to the non-elect, we do not attribute to Him
anything futile, or insincere; because, in the
expressed condition: that they shall turn, He does
not say anywhere, that He has any desire to see anyone saved
while continuing a rebel. Nor does He say anywhere, that it is
His unconditioned purpose to compel all to turn. But He says,
He would like to see all saved provided they all
turned. So that His will in the universal call is
not out of harmony with His prescience. And last:
God's invitations and warnings to those, who, He foresees,
will reject them, are the necessary expressions of His
perfections. The circumstance that a given sin is foreseen,
does not rob it of its moral character; and hence should
constitute no reason why a righteous God shall forebear to
prohibit and warn against it. That God shall yet
permit creatures to commit this sin against His invitations
is, therefore, just the old question about the permission
of evil. Not a new one.”
Though
the complainants might reproach Dabney for trying to answer
questions and solve paradoxes instead of letting
things stand without explanation, Dabney's statement is the
kind of careful wording that is to be approved; This
is the form of doctrine that Dr. Clark accepts; and this is
sufficient.
* * * * *
Preliminary
to the final conclusion of this answer to the Complaint, the
Presbytery calls attention to what is required of a Complaint
intended, in this case by indirection, to prove a charge of
heresy. In the famous Briggs trial fifty years ago, Mr. John
J. McCook, a member of the prosecuting committee
argued: “It is not necessary to dwel upon the fact
that a minister cannot be tried for consequences which may be
deduced from his doctrines” (page 4). In the present
case, however, it is necessary to dwell upon this fact. The
standards the prosecuting committee in the Briggs trial set
for itself are not the standards of the present Complaint.
This Complaint makes extremely tenuous deductions from Dr.
Clark's statements, at times directly contradicting the
evidence; Dr. Clark does not acknowledge these
deductions; and yet on the basis of these
unacknowledged and repudiated deductions the Complaint aks
that his licensure and the decision to ordain him be declared
null and void. This procedure once noticed ought not to
require comment. Would church administration be all
possible if ministers are to be condemned on the basis of
their opponents' questionable deductions?
In
conclusion, the Presbytery denies that the meeting of July 7,
1944, was illegal and that its actions are thus void.
The Presbytery judges that the Complaint fails to prove that
Dr. Clark's thinking “bears ll the earmarks of
rationalism, humanistic intellectualism . . .
vicious independence from God” (P. 10, 2; O. 40). The
Presbytery denies “that various views of Dr. Clark as set
forth in that meeting, and with which this Complaint is
concerned, are in error and in conflict with the
constitutional requirements for licensure and ordination, and
that, therefore, the decision to sustain his theological
examination, the decision to waive two years of
study in a theological seminary, the decision to proceed to
license Dr. Clark and the action of licensing him, the
decision to deem the examination for licensure sufficient for
ordination, and the decision to ordain Dr. Clark,
were in error and unconstitutional, and are,
therefore, null and void” (P. 15, 3; O. 61). The Presbytery
urges the complainants to study this answer to the Complaint;
to acknowledge that they have misrepresented Dr.
Clark's views, and that they have wronged him in
charging that “Dr. Clark studiously avoided answering” (P. 8,
1; O. 30) a question asked him during his
examination; and to desist from their Complaint.
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