The Bible and the Bible alone is the word of God. 2 Timothy 3:16
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Defends the Gospel of Jesus Christ and classical confessional Calvinism. The term "Reformed" refers to the five solas of the Reformation and the two classical confessional standards: the Three Forms of Unity, and the Westminster Standards. Isaiah 1:18; Romans 12:1,2.
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The Bible and the Bible alone is the word of God. 2 Timothy 3:16
I'm not an expert in making and uploading videos. However, this is my first video uploaded to the Reasonable Christian channel in YouTube: Reasonable Christian Apologetics channel.
Again, a rationalist like Mises would not argue that we cannot make empirical observations. Mises only argues that empirical observation cannot provide us with the knowledge of laws of cause and effect. Clark, however, mistrusts all empirical knowledge. And this is where Clark’s views on the nature of history become unclear. Whether, in Clark’s view, historians can arrive at any kind of truth or knowledge [if not ultimate truth] through observation, is not clear. He appears inconsistent on this point, when he claims that history has shaped his views. How is it possible to learn political lessons from history, as Clark claims he has (on page 339), if he is a hard skeptic concerning the ability to ascertain any knowledge from empirical methods?
Clark seems consistent when arguing that “No event is subject to absolute verification.”, but he follows this by saying that “Different amounts of evidence can be produced for different events. But there is no compelling logical reason to believe any particular piece of evidence. This is true of the Gospels, as the contemporary theologians persistently proclaim; but it is equally true of Thucydides. “ [368]
If, however, the empirical method is incapable of producing knowledge at all, as Clark seems to claim, how can Clark even speak of “evidence.”? What is historical evidence if not knowledge of some attribute of the past? If we recognize something as evidence, or even admit the existence of evidence, do we not also confirm the existence of some form of empirical knowledge?
Clark seems to say that one can indeed learn from observation, but the act of accepting the truth of testimony (or any historical source) is a matter of faith. [231] He explains that for secular and religious history, interpretations and frameworks are indispensable. [346] By this, he means that we cannot admit, organize, or explain empirical knowledge without pre-suppositions about this knowledge.
Yet, if empirical observations are incapable of providing knowledge, how can Clark make any claims about particular historical events, or takes sides in a historiographical debate as he does on pages 73-74? Is it only a matter of faith that he sides against the historical views of Charles Beard?
Michael Douma, Ibid.
Now by way of conclusion to this lengthy volume, and especially as a conclusion to Part Two, I would like to first point out the inferiority of the contemporary theologians in comparison with the secular historiographers. Many of the latter may be wrong. Criticism of their positions have been free. But with the exception of the Marxists the secular historiographers give arguments worth considering and do not pontificate with arbitrary and consistent abandon as the dialectical theologians do. Not only with arbitrary and inconsistent abandon, but also with an evident ignorance of historiography. Clark, Ibid., p. 335.
In the second place, these theologians who constantly insist that events recounted in myths, or, better, in sagas, and sometimes called Geschichten, are unverifiable by the scientific methods of historiography fail to realize that no event is subject to absolute verification. Different amounts of evidence can be produced for different events. But there is no compelling logical reason to believe any particular piece of evidence. This is true of the Gospels, as contemporary theologians persistently proclaim; but it is equally true of Thucydides. Historiographical theory should apply impartially to both; but the dialectical theologians are unwilling to treat the Bible as they treat other historical books. They may claim to do so. They may say that scientific verification assures us of such and such event in the Peloponnesian War, while it leaves us with no information about Jesus. But this is to apply impossible norms to Genesis and to the Gospels, which no one, including themselves applies to Herodotus and Thucydides.
With respect to the above matters and before the final paragraph of this volume, one other matter should no doubt be disposed of for the sake of historians who may be unfamiliar with philosophical methods and even for the sake of some philosophers who believe that a debate between two positions can be carried on only on the basis of a common area of agreement. The objection to a presuppositionalist view of history or theology, or anything else, is that "communication," to use a contemporary cliché, requires the contestants to occupy a common ground. When one historian says, "my framework for history implies that such and such is the significance of this event and that therefore or also this evidence is true," and when another historian says, "my presuppositions imply the reverse of all that," then the objectivist or empiricist is quick to claim that the debate cannot be resolved, for there is nothing to which one man can appeal in his effort to convince the other. Each has his own presuppositions, and each follows their logical implications.
The situation is even worse and more thoroughgoing in theology than in history. . . .
Dr. Gordon H. Clark, Ibid. Pp. 335-336.
The only personal solution to this logical impasse is a change of heart on the part of one of the contestants. Agreement can be obtained only by one party's repudiating his premises and accepting the other's presuppositions. One of them must be converted. One must be regenerated. One must be born again. And the change is something logic cannot do. God alone is able.
However, this ultimate confrontation of two antagonistic systems does not always come this clearly to the surface. No doubt it is always below the surface.
Clark, ibid. P. 337.
For Clark, logic is the common ground-principle between believers and unbelievers (based on the argument in book gamma of Aristotle’s Metaphysics), but logic needs true premises—premises that are logically primitive, basic beliefs. We must have a source of such incontrovertibly certain truths—foundational truths—if we are to deduce anything by means of logic, since conclusions are only as good as the premises from which they derive. Clark also believes (following Augustine) that the assertion of skepticism is self-refuting and that skepticism is the reductio ad absurdum of any epistemological theory (i.e., any theory that leads to skepticism can be eliminated from further consideration). He thus seeks to eliminate all competition to his axiom by reducing all other epistemological contenders to skepticism. After the field is cleared of rationalism and empiricism, if he can show that the axiom he has proposed succeeds in making some knowledge possible (a set of propositions, however limited in number), he believes he has justified his starting point. The only test of his system of propositions is the logical test of the internal consistency of the system qua a coherent, noncontradictory system. (Ibid.)
Because this whole subject has so many facets, and because the details are so complex, the conclusion can canvas only one objection. The objection is this. If every system of philosophy derives from its own unique set of axioms, it becomes impossible for those who accept one set of axioms to hold a meaningful discussion with those who hold another set. The two parties to the dispute have nothing in common, and hence, neither has any basis for convincing the other. This is an ancient, not a recent, objection. It does not require genius to think it up. But though so common, indeed because it is so common, it needs a clear answer. An historical reference will serve as a starting point.
Anselm wanted to appeal to the Jews and Moslems on their own ground without using revelation. “Reason” (in quotation marks) was supposed to be the common ground. But “reason” (in quotation marks) was not clearly defined nor was a common proposition actually identified. But common sense supposes that whenever we try to persuade people of anything, we appeal to what they already believe. But common sense is wrong. This works only on secondary matters and not on all of them. On basic matters no one ever appeals to a common ground between two systems of philosophy.
Take this for example. Can an empiricist, on the basis of sensation, convince me of empiricism when I do not accept sensation? Well, how then may we present the Gospel to an unbeliever? We present the Gospel as fully as possible. We explain to him as many of the historical details as we have time for and as many of the logical connections as our prospect will listen to. But sermons, arguments, and explanations will not convert him. The Christian worker cannot convince him of the truth of the Gospel. He is not supposed to. After we present the Gospel, we then pray that the Holy Ghost will convince him, that God will change his mind, grant him repentance, that God will give him the divine gift of faith, cause him to believe the axioms of Scripture and raise him from the death of sin to a new life in Christ.
[From the transcript of Gordon H. Clark's audio lecture, "How Does Man Know God?" Posted at the Gordon H. Clark Foundation website. For the Sermonaudio version of this lecture click here.]
Verse 16 continues the sentence in verse 15. [Philippians 1:15, 16]. Those who had been emboldened to preach publicly were divided into two groups. Some preached from good motives; some did not. The former loved both Paul and the Gospel. They knew and were inspired by the fact that Paul was completely devoted to the defense of the Gospel.
The word for defense is apologia: in technical theology, apologetics. Some misguided Christians today repudiate argumentation. The New Testament does not. Not only is apologia in 1 Peter 3:15; it is also in Acts 22:1, 1 Corinthians 9:3, 2 Corinthians 7:11, and Philippians 1:7, as we recently saw. Mark 9:10 has the disciples "questioning one with another" (suzeteo)--they were acting properly. In Mark 12:28 a scribe had heard Jesus arguing with the Sadducees. Acts 6:9 has some people disputing with Stephen and clearly Stephen disputed with them, as 6:10 [Acts 6:10] very forcefully indicates. Barnabus in Acts 9:29 defends the recently converted Paul by telling the suspicious disciples that Paul disputed against the Grecians. Well, these verses should be enough to silence those who think that a Christian should not argue.
Dr. Gordon H. Clark. Philippians. (Hobbs: The Trinity Foundation, 1996). Page 28.
See also: Philippians.
Gordon H. Clark's discussion of and definition of apologetics is given in this lecture. The question and answer session at the end of the lecture is extremely interesting, particularly when Clark refutes empiricism and the idea that the five senses can be trusted as a reliable source of propositional truth. His example of the judicial/legal system as being frequently wrong stands out here. If the judicial system can be so often wrong, the implications for empirical science and the philosophy of science are astounding. Thomas Kuhn's book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, comes to mind here. Science, according to true believers, is self-correcting. However, as paradigms are continually shifting based on changing empirical evidences, it seems that science along with the legal system is frequently wrong. So what is a reliable source of propositional truth and revelation? Good question! Dr. Clark's lecture will force you to rethink your doctrine of general or natural revelation. Click on the title of this article or click here to listen to this lecture: What is Apologetics?